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INTRODUCTION 
The significance of the philosophy of David Hume is two-fold. First, 
his work marks ~~e end of an important cycle in the history of philosophy. 
Gilson has rightly termed this period as "the Cartesian cycle."1 Hume's 
thought also had a great influence upon Immanuel Kant. In fact Kant 
confesses that it was David Hume who aroused hL~ from his dogmatic slumber, 
2 
and started him in a new direction in his philosophic thought. Kant, we 
know, was confronted with the problem of the relationship of the phenomenal 
to the noumenal world. David Hume likewise faced the problem of the externa 
world. What is the relationship between thought and things, and between 
the individual and the external world? 
This study will consider and evaluate Hume's solution to this problem, 
based principally on Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, as well as his 
Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding• Particularly L~portant in this 
1 Etienne Gilson, The Unity ~ Philosophical Experience. Charles Scrib~s 
Sons, Kew York, 1937, 219. 
2 Irmnanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysi2_• transle.ted by H.P. 
Mahaffy and J.H. Bernard, Macmillan Co., Few York, 1889. In the 
Introduction Kant says: "I honestly confess the suggestion of David 
Hume •••• first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, end gave my investigation 
in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction." 
1 
2 
study are the following parts of the Treatise: 
Book r, rv, 1. Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason 
Book I, IV, 2. Of Scepticism with Regard to the s-enses 
Book I, rv,4. Of MOdern Philosophy 
Book I,IV,5. Of the Immateriality of the Soul 
Hume also briefly treats of this subject in his Inquiry Concerning ~ 
Human Understandin~, in Section XII,I, entitled, Or the Academic or Sceptical 
Philosophy. The treatment of this study is as follows: 
CHAPTER I AN ACCOUNT OF flUME'S POSITION 
An account of Hume's position, which determines 
his conclusion concerning the external world, by 
showing his purpose, first principle, procedure, 
and the fundamentals of his theory of knowledge 
appropriate to our problem. 
CHAPTER II AN ANALYSIS OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 
Hume's analysis of the origin of our belief 
in the external world, which is not from t~e 
senses, nor from reason, but from the tmagi-
nation. 
CHAPTER III THE REASONS FROM HUME t 8 POSIT ION 
A consideration of Hume's theory of knowl-
edge in its relationship to Locke and Berkeley, 
and the consequent originality in the problem 
of the external world. 
' CHAPTER IV AN EVALUATION OF HUME'S POSITION 
A two part critical estimate of flume's 
problem and its solution; the principle of 
immanence creates a pseudo-problem; flume's 
procedure involves inadequacies and incon-
sistencies. 
CH.API'ER I 
AN ACCOUNT OF HDME'S POSITION 
Let us consider, first, the purpose of Hume's philosophy. He states 
it for us in the Introduction to his Treatise. He is certain that all the 
sciences are related in a greater or lesser degree to human nature, and 
that no matter how far they may seem to be from human nature, they must 
1 
still return by one passage or another. Thus, Hume continues, ~~thematics, 
Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion are in some degree, at least, 
dependent upon man. If this be true of these sciences, how much more is it 
true of the other sciences so intimately related to man, such as Logic, 
Morals, Criticis.m and Politics. He therefore feels that the only hope for 
success in our philosophical researches, is to leave behind what Hume terms 
in the Introduction, "the tedious lingering method," which has been followed 
in the past, and instead of taking one castle or village or frontier, it 
is now in order to march right to the center and capital of all these 
sciences, to human nature itself, which if once mastered, it is hoped, will 
1 d 1 t . t 2 ea everyone e se o easy v~c ory. 
Starting from this anthropocentric position, Hume maintains that the 
only foundation for the study of man is experience and observation.3 
1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. 2 vols., edited by T.H. Greene 
and T.H. Grose., Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1882, Introduction. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 4 
5 
Just as the only foundation for all the sciences is the solid foundation 
of the science of man~ so likewise the only solid foundation for the science 
of man is and must be in experience and observation. By experience Hume 
means what he himself terms as "experimental philosophy," which he illus-
trates thus: 
When I am at a loss to know the effects of one 
body upon another in any situation, I need only put 
them in that situation, and observe what results from 
it.4 
This experimental method becomes then, one of the important factors 
in his whole philosophy, and is the key to his whole position. A summa~J 
of the implications of this statement as well as the position itself is 
well expressed by N.K. Smith: 
Experiment is, Hume teaches us, the final court 
of appeal in respect to all matters of fact. But it 
can supply only particulars, and even these only in 
diffe5ent circumstances and situations appropriate to 
them. 
Hume further holds that the essence of both mind and external bodies 
is unknown. His own words are the best evidence of his thought: 
4 Ibid. 
For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the 
mind being equally unknown to us with that of 
external bodies, it must be equally impossible 
to form any notion of its powers and qualities 6 
otherwise than from careful and exact experiments. 
5 Norman Kemp Smith, ~Philosophy 2,! David~ .. ! Critical Study of~ 
Origins and Central Doctrines, ~~cmillan Co., London, 1941, 61. 
6 Hume, Introduction. 
6 
If the mind by experiments can only know particulars, as Hume has 
already indicated, it is certain it can never know essences. This leads 
Hume to two further significant statements: (1) Ultimate and universal 
principles are impossible, and (2) any hypothesis pretending to discover 
ultimate qualities of human nature ought at first to be rejected as pre-
sumptuous and chimerical.7 
From this account of his purpose we turn directly to his first prin-
oiple, which is the basis of his whole philosophy. 
The first principles of Hume's whole philosophic structure is that "no 
beings are ever present ~o the mind but perceptions."8 Furthermore these 
perceptions are the only existences of which we are certain, which being im-
mediately present to our consciousness, command our strongest agreenent and 
thus are the first foundation of all of our conclusions.9 
Hume includes in the term perception, .all the actions of sight, hearing, 
judging, loving and hating, as well as thinking. In the opening statement 
of his Treatise, he states that all that enters the mind in any for.m is a 
perception. 
7 Ibid. 
All the perceptions of the human mind resolve 
themselves into two kinds, which I call impressions 
and ideas.10 
8 Ibid., I,IV,2. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. Introduction. 
,.... .. 
7 
Concerning this opening statement in the Treatise, Hendel in his 
Studies in the Philosophy of Hume states that in the opening part of the 
Treatise there is contained new terminology and distinctions, so that all 
that exists as far as the mind is concerned are these perceptions.11 
The question arises, how does Hume develop this first principle? This 
is our next consideration, the procedure in the development of Hurne's 
philosophf, which includes the description of both impressions and ideas, 
the distinction between them, as well as a description of the mind. 
First, Hume presents his definition of both impressions and ideas. 
By impressions he understands all of our sensations, passions, and emotions, 
as they enter the soul. These enter the soul with most force and violence. 
Hume describes them thus: 
Those perceptions which enter with most force 
and violence, we may n~e impressions; and under this 
n~e, I comprehend all our sensations, paasions and 
emoti~Rs, as they make their first appearance in the 
soul. 
He defines and describes ideas as follows: 
By ideas, I mean the faint images of these in 
thinking and reasoning; such as for instance, are 
all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, 
exceptfgg only those which arise £rom the sight and 
touch. 
He does not believe it further necessary to use words in the explanation 
of the difference between impressions and ideas. He feels that everyone 
11 Charles W. Hendel, Studies in~ Philosophy~ David Hume, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1925, 112. 
12 Hume, I,I,l. 
13 Ibid. 
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will personally readily perceive the difference between feeling and thinking. 
The ordinary degrees of these are easily distinguished; although Hume admits 
it is not impossible in particular instances that they may easily and nearly 
approach each other. 
He points out, for ex~ple, how in sleep, or in fever, or in madness. 
or in any other violent emotion of the soul, our ideas may approach our 
impressions, or, onthe other hand, it sometimes happens that our impressions 
are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas.14 
Hume still further divides impressions and ideas into simple and complex 
By simple perceptions, that is impressions and ideas, he means such which 
allow of no distinction or separation, while the complex are contrary to the 
simple, and may be distinguished into parts. Hume illustrates what he has in 
mind. In an apple, a particular color, taste, and smell are qualities united 
together in the apple, "though it is easy to perceive they are not the same, 
but are at least distinguishable from each other."l5 
However, to understand more clearly Hume's analysis, it is necessary to 
consider the division of the impressions. These impressions may be divided 
into two kinds, impressions of sensation, and those of reflection. ]npres-
sions of sensation arise in the soul, from causes unknown, while impressions 
from reflection are derived at least in a great measure, from our ideas, in 
the following way. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
9 
An impression strikes first upon the senses, and makes us perceive 
either heat or cold, hunger or thirst, pleasure or pain. Or this impression 
the mind makes a copy, which still remains after the impression has already 
ceased, and this we call an idea. This idea, if for example, it be pleasure 
or pain, when it has returned to the soul, again produces new impressions of 
desire and aversion, hope and fear. These new impressions may properly be 
called impressions of reflection, because they are derived from it. lle 
concludes this analysis by describing impressions of reflection as passions, 
desires, and emotions arising mostly from ideas.16 
llume further explains his division of impressions by describing the 
three kinds of sense impressions. 
First, there are sense impressions of figure, bulk, motion and solidity 
of bodies. Also there are those of color, taste, smells and sounds, heat 
and cold. While the third kind of sense L~pressions includes pains end 
pleasures that arise from the application of objects to our bodies, such as 
the cutting of flesh with steel and the like.17 
As all ideas are copies of previous impressions, and since these 
impressions are perceptions of the mind, and no beings are ever present to t 
mind but these perceptions, which are the only existences of which we are 
certain, we ask the question, what is the mind in which these perceptions 
appear, and how does it operate? This leads to our last consideration in 
Hume's procedure, his definition and description of the mind. He describes 
the mind in the following manner: 
16 ~., I,I,2. 
What we call a mind is nothing but a heap or 
collection of different perceptions, united together 
by certain relations, and supposed though falsely, 18 to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity. 
10 
In another later passage Hum.e describes the operation of the mind. He 
likens the mind to a kind of theater, where several perceptions appear, 
pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and 
sensations. However, he warns us that the comparison of the theater must 
not mislead us. For the successive perceptions alone are what constitutes 
the mind, nor do we have the most distant notion of the place where the 
19 
senses are represented, nor the materials of which they are composed. 
Thus flume begins with the purpose of building a philosophy upon the 
science of human nature. The basis of his new philosophy must be the 
structure of experience and observation. However, it must be remembered, 
that observation means and includes the experimental method, which deals 
only with particula.rs. Hence essences remain unknown and the possibility 
of any ultimates or universals must be ruled out at the very beginning. 
This involved inHume's first principle, that no beings are ever present to 
the mind but only perceptions. 
These perceptions are all so many impressions e.nd ideas. The impres-
sions include sensations, passions, and emotions as they first enter the 
soul. They enter '~ith most force and violence." However, impressions 
appear again as faint images, which Hume calls ideas. He distinguishes 
18 Ibid. 
19 ~., I,IV,6. 
11 
between impressions of sensation, which arise in the soul from causes un-
lalown, and impressions of reflection which arc derived in a great measure 
from our ideas. And the mind is nothing but a heap or collection of these 
perceptions. 
Having thus considered the purpose of Hume's philosophy, his first 
principle, and the procedure in the development of his thought, let us 
consider now those main tenets which clearly show how he deals with the 
problem of the external world. These four major doctrines include his anal-
ysis of reason, the importance of belief, the meaning of knowledge, and the 
place of the L~agination. 
First, we consider Hume's analysis of reason. 
Hume holds reason to be only the slave of the passions. 
Reason is, and ought only to be, the sla.ve of 
the passions, and can never pre~end to any other office 
than to serve and to obey them. 0 
This is indeed an innovation in Hume's thought; in fact, he shows in 
the context of this passage that it is customary in philosophy to speak of 
the strife between passion and reason, and the pre-eminence of reason. The 
greater part of ancient and modern philosophy is founded on the "supposed 
pre-eminence of reason." 21 This subordination of reason to the passions is 
central in Hume's philosophy and runs throughout his whole thought. 22 That 
---------------------
20 ~·~ II,III,3. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Smith., 154. 
~ ------------------------------------------------------------~ 
12 
Hume was no doubt greatly inrluenced in his view by Hutcheson has been well 
expressed by Smith. 23 
There are two kinds of reason, according to Hume: 
All reasonings may be divided into two. kinds, na~ely 
demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations or 
ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matters 
or ract and existence.24 
Demonstrative reason considers the comparison of ideas, as round in 
mathematics, while moral reasoning "is connected with Rume's view or our 
k~owledge as determined by natural belier, and possessing no absolute 
metaphysical truth."25 
Hume also holds that it is impossible to defend either reason or the 
senses. 
It is impossible, upon my system, to derend either 
understanding or senses; and we but expose them further 
when we endeavor to justiry them in that manner.26 
Likewise he maintains that reason and the senses are in opposition to 
each other. 
23 Ibid., Here Smith shows that the main inrluenoe of Hutcheson upon Hume 
was in the inversion or the roles ordinarily ascribed to passion and to 
reason respectively. Passion is the term used by Hutcheson, as it is by 
Hume, to cover all types or feelings, not only reeling in the strict 
sense, (i.e. pleasure and pain) but also the instinctive bodily appetites 
the emotions and sentiments, and in addition all the various types of 
appreciation which find expression in values of judgments ••• Accordingly 
Hutcheson's teaching appears in a new and revolutionary light in Hume, 
when he rerormulates it in his fundamental maxim, reason is the slave of 
the pass ions. 
24 Hume, ~ Inquiry Concerning ~ Human Understanding ~ An Inquirz 
Concerning~ Principles ~ N~rals. Introduction by Selby-Biggs, M.A. 
Glarendon Press, Oxford, 1894, I, 4. 
25 Smith, 99. 
_26 HuntEb Treatise, I., IV, 2. 
~·· 
~------------------------------------------------------------
There is a direct and total opposition betwixt 
our reason and our senses, or more properly speaking, 
betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, 
and those that persuade us of continued and independent 
existence of body.27 
Finally, the reason is limited in that it cannot give the lowest 
13 
degree of evidence in support of any proposition, either in philosophy or 
• . 28 
ord2nary l2fe. To further illustrate this point he cites the example of 
the Cynics, as 
An extraordinary instance of philosophers, who, 
from reasonings purely philosophical, ran into great 
extravagances of conduct.29 
The second main doctrine of Hume is that of belief. First, we have 
Eume's own definitions of belief. 
A belief may be most accurately defined as a 
lively idea related or associated with a present 
impression.3° 
In the very next section Hume defines belief to be "nothing but a 
strong and lively idea, derived from a present L~pression related to it."31 
In both of the above definitions belief is a lively and strong idea. 
However, in the first of these definitions is shown the relationship of the 
27 ~·· I, IV,4. 
28 ~., I, IV,-7. 
29 Ibid. 
30 ~·· I, III, 7. 
:n Ibid., I,III,8. 
14 
idea. of belief to an impression, ·as shown in the expression, "associated 
-with", whereas in the second definition, is shown the origin of the idea, as 
being "derived from a present impression." 
Belief is further described as an act of the mind arising from custom.32 
Hume also holds to two natural beliefs. First, .that objects have a 
continuing, independent existence, and second, that these bodies are 
operative one upon another. 
We may well ask, what causes induce us to believe 
in the existence of body? But it is vain to ask, whether 
there be body or not? That is a point taken for granted 
in all our reasonings.33 
He defends this view by showing that nature does not leave this to our 
choice, since it is of too great importance, "to be trusted to our uncertain 
reasonings and speculations."34 
The operation of belief is described by Hume when he concludes 
That belief consists merely in a certain feeling 
or sentiment; in something that depends not on the will, 
but must arise from certain determinate causes and 
principles of which we are not masters.35 
Thus in the operation of belief Hume feels there is a determinate 
factor over which we have no control. 
32 ~·· I, III,S; I, III,9; and I, IV, 2. 
33 ~·· I, IV, 2. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., Appendix. 
15 
There is also a distinction between belief and imagination, which is 
vital inHume's theory of knowledge. In the first distinction Hume asserts 
that 
The belief or assent, which always attends the 
memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those 
perceptions they present; and this alone distinguishes 
them from the imagination.36 
A further explanation of the distinction between belief and imagination 
is found in the Inquiry. 
The difference between fiction and belief lies 
in some sentiment, or feeling which is annexed to the 
latter, not to the former, and which depends not on 
the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. It must 
be excited by nature, like all other sentiments; and 
must arise from the particular situation in which the 
mind is placed at any particular juncture.37 
Thus, Hume continues, whenever any object is presented to the memory, 
it i'lll1lediately by force of custom carries the imagination to conceive the 
object, which is usually joined to it. This conception is attended with a 
feeling or sentiment that is different from any of the loose reveries of the 
fancy. This is the whole nature of belief.38 
The third major doctrine in Hume's philosophy concerns the nature of 
, knowledge. 
First, knowledge consists only in the comparison of ideas. Hume admits 
that he defines knowledge in the s~e way as those philosophers who consider 
36 ~·• I, III, s. 
37 ~·• Inquiry, V, II. 
38 Ibid. 
~----~------------------~------~ 
16 
knowledge to be evidence arising from the comparison of ideas. And lest 
there be any misunderstanding, in the same section, in fact in the same 
paragraph, he again states his position: "By knowledge I mean the assurance 
arising from the comparison of ideas."39 
Therefore, since Hume has already asserted that only perceptions exist, 
and that the mind is nothing but a heap or collection of these perceptions 
united by relations, it follows that ideas, which form the essence of 
knowledge, and are themselves "perceptions", must in the nature of the case 
also involve certain relationships; and thus knowledge is nothing but a 
subjectiye comparison of ideas. 
Again, knowledge is reduced to probability. For since the mind knows 
only its own perceptions, and since _all are within the soul of man, the 
conclusion is quite final, namely, that knowledge is reduced to a mere matter 
of probability. To this conclusion Hume devotes considerable attention. 
Since our reason is to be considered a kind of cause, of which truth is the 
natural consequence, and truth may frequently be missed because of the 
irruption of other causes, as well as by the constancy of our minds, the 
conclusion becomes evident, for 
By this means all knowledge degenerates into 
probability; and this probability is greater or less, 
according to our experience of the veracity or deceit-
fulness of our understanding, and according to the 
simplicity or intricacy of the question.40 
39 Hume, Treatise, I,III,ll. 
40 ~., I, IV, 1. 
~----------------------------------~ 
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The argument is further developed by showing that in all demonstrative 
sciences there are rules which are certain and infallible. But when we 
apply these rules our fallible and uncertain faculties are liable to enter in 
and thus result in error. This argmnent he develops by an exa.r.tple from math-
ematics: 
There is no algebraist, no mathematician, so 
expert in his science, as to place entire confidence 
in any truth immediately upon discovery of it, nor 
regard it as anything but a mere probability. Every 
tL~e he runs over his proofs, his confidence increases; 
but still more by the approbation of friends. Now it 
is evident that this gradual increase of assurance is 
nothing but the addition of new probabilities.41 
After showing the same situation to exist in numbers, he concludes 
that therefore all our knowledge resolves itself into probabilities. lYhat 
is the basis for such a conclusion? Here Hume presents three reasons for the 
probability and uncertainty of knowledge. 
First, the original uncertainty inherent in the subject. Then also the 
uncertainty derived from the weakness of that faculty which judges, and 
third, the possibility of error in the estimation we make of truth and the 
fidelity of our faculties.42 
Therefore, since all our knowledge is only a matter of probability, and 
as Hume has already stated, since the senses are in opposition to reason, 
and that neither of them can be defended, he is now ready for his conclusion. 
What is the conclusion, and to what end is his whole discussion of our know-
ledge of the external world? He answers in summary: 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
~~ intention then •••• is only to make the reader 
more sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all 
our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived 
from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly 
an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of 
our nature.43 
From Hume's analysis of reason, the bnportance of belief and the 
18 
doctrine of knowledge, we may proceed to his fourth major doctrine, that of 
the imagination. His view of the imagination is basic to his solution of 
the problem of the external world. He himself admits that the imagination 
is "the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy."44 In fact, Price 
holds that "the word 'imagination,' is the keyword to Hume's whole theory 
of knowledge."45 
Since all impressions are internal, that is, subjective, the belief or 
notion, as he terms it, of their distinct and continued existence must come 
from the agreement of some qualities with the imagination.46 
~Vhen any impression has been present with the mind it appears again as 
an idea, and this takes place in one of two ways. 'V'Ihen it appears again it 
may retain a considerable degree of its original liveliness, somewhat between 
an impression or an idea, or perhaps it may lose that liveliness and remain 
a perfect idea. The faculty by which the impressions are repeated the first 
43 Ibid. 
44 ~·• I, IV,4. , 
45 H.H. Price, Hume's Theory~~ External World. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1940, 15. 
46 Hume, I,IV,2. 
19 
way is called memory, while that of the second~ imagination. Thus, it is 
obvious that the ideas of the memory are more lively and strong than those 
of the imagination.47 
However, it is well to remember that neither the ideas of memory nor 
imagination, that is neither the lively nor the faint ideas, can appear in 
the mind, unless their concurrent impressions have gone before them to pre-
48 pare the way. 
One other aspect of the imagination must be kept in mind. It seems that 
the imagination has the power of choice as well as of suggestion and its free 
play is almost boundless. Hume describes it thus: 
Nothing is more admirable than the readiness with 
which the imagination suggests its ideas, and presents 
them at the very instant at which they become necessary 
or useful. The fancy runs from one end of the universe 
to the other, in collecting those ideas which belong 
alone to any subj~ct. One would think that the whole 
intellectual world of ideas was at once subjected to our 
view, and that we did nothing but pick out such as were 
proper for our purpose.49 
Thus the whole ph'ilosophic system of Hume centers around these four 
major doctrines: reason, belief, knowledge and the imagination. 
Reason, Hume holds, is and ought to be the slave of the passions. There 
are two kinds of reason, demonstrative and moral reasoning. Furbher, it is 
impossible to defend either reason or the senses, since there is a total 
48 Ibid. 
49 ~·~ I, I, 7. 
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opposition between them, and the reason is limited in that it is unable to 
give the least degree of evidence in support of any proposition, either 
in philosophy or in ordinary life• 
Belief is nothing but a strong and lively idea associated and derived 
from impressions, and is an act of the mind arising from custom. There are 
two natural beliefs, that bodies have a continuing and independent existence, 
and that these bodies are operative one upon another. In its operation 
belief is merely a certain feeling or sentiment, not dependent upon the will, 
but arises from determ.inate causes over which we have no control. 
Knowledge consists only in the comparison of i~eas, and since this 
comparison is a subjective process, all knowledge is reduced to probability. 
The imagination is the ultimate judge of all philosophy, and is to be 
distinguished from the memory, in that memory consists in more forceful 
ideas, while the imagination involves less lively ideas, in fact, it may lose 
that liveliness and thus become a perfect idea. 
If reason is not a faculty but only a slave of passion, and belief is 
only a matter of impressions, which in turn are perceptions arising in the 
mind of man, Hume has committed himself to a sensist theory of knowledge. 
The imagination, moreover, which becomes the faculty by which we attribute 
continued and distinct existences, gives no certainty beyond natural belief. 
Whether or not Hume has validly reduced reason, demonstrative knowledge, 
and belief to the level of ideas and impressions, we shall reserve to our 
final chapter. What we have presented here is the basis - the only basis, 
on which Hume can hope to account for a real world independent of the world 
of thought. Can knowledge, as Hume explains it, solve the problem of the 
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external world? 
David Hume posed the problem and likewise solved the problem in his own 
fashion. We must now turn to his solution. 
CHAPTER II 
HUME 1 S SOLlJT ION TO TEE PROBLE)JI OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 
Hume' s solution of the problem of the external world involves two 
questions; first, why is it that we attribute a continued existence to 
objects, even when they are not present to the senses? Furthermore, why 
do we suppose them to have an existence distinct from the mind and perception~ 
Thus he begins his studywith the following paragraph1 
The subject, then, of our present inquiry concerning 
the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of 
the body; and my reasonings under this head, I shall begin 
with a distinction which at first sight may seem super-
fluous, but which will contribute very much to the perfect 
understanding of what follows. We ought to examine apart 
these two questions which are co~~only confounded together, 
viz, Why we attribute a continued existence to objects, 
even when they are not present to the senses; and why we 
suppose them to have an existence distinct from the mind 
and perception? Under this head I comprehend their 
situation as well as relations, their external position 
as well as the independence~f their existence and operation.1 
These two questions Hume considers to be intimately connected, and 
there are two reasons for their close relationships. First of all, if the 
objects of the senses continue their existence, even when they are not 
perceived, it follows that their existence is of course independent of and 
distinct from the perceptions; and also vice versa, if they exist inde-
1 Hume, Treatise, I,IV,2. 
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pendently of the perception and distinct from it, then of course they must 
continue to exist, even when they are not perceived. But though the decision 
of the one question decides the other, still in order that we may "more 
easily discover the principles of human nature, from whence this decision 
arises," we shall carry along this distinction.2 
After thus stating the problem, Hume proceeds to his solution. He does 
not admit the acceptance of the external world to be anything but belief. 
There are only three possible ways of approach, for we arrive at the belief 
in the external world, either by the senses, or by reason, or by the 
. . t' 3 mag~na ~on. 
As for the senses, they are incapable of giving any notion of the 
continued existence of their objects, for the following three reasons: 
The senses can only produce opinion of a distinct existence, not of a 
continued existence. For Hume, it is obvious that the senses are incapable 
of giving any opinion regarding the continued existence of their objects, 
after they are no longer present to the senses. To do so, the senses would 
have to continue to operate after they have ceased to operate. 
Hence, the senses could only produce the opinion of a distinct, but not 
of a continued existence. And if they are thus to function, they must either 
present their impressions as images and representations, or else as distinct 
and external existences. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., We shall consider whether it be the senses, reason or the imaginl'l.-
tion, that produces the opinion of a continued or of a distinct existence• ' 
T~ese are the only questions which are intelligible on the present subject. 
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But the senses convey only single impressions. For it is evident that 
our senses do not convey impressions as images of something distinct, or 
independent and external, because they show us nothing but a single perception 
~nd never intimate anything more than that. And a single perception can 
~ever produce the idea of double existence, except as it is done by inference 
~ither by reason or the imagination. By double existence Hume simply means 
~he continued existence of objects after they have ceased to be perceived by 
~he senses. 
The third reason Hume presents for asserting the incapacity of the senses 
to give any notion of a continued existence is due to the fac·t, that if the 
senses convey any idea of a distinct existence, it must be conveyed by a kind 
of fallacy or illusion. 
All sensations are felt by the mind, and v~en we are not sure that they 
present themselves as distinct objects, or as mere Lmpressions, the difficulty 
lies not in their nature, but rather in their relations and situations. Now 
if it were possible for the senses to present our impressions as external to 
and distinctly independent of ourselves, both the objects as well as our-
selves would have to be evident to our senses; otherwise they could not be 
compared by these faculties.4 
It is at this point that Hume raises the question which is at the center 
of our sense knowledge and determines it, na~ely, "How far are we ourselves 
the objects of our s enses?"5 He does admit the complexity of this issue, for 
he is sure that "there is no question in philosophy more abstruse than that 
~-------------------
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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concerning identity, and the nature of the uniting principle, which consti-
tutes a person."6 Further he concedes that the senses are not adequate to 
determine this question, but that rather, "we must have recourse to the most 
profound metaphysics to give a satisfactory answer to it."7 However, in 
ordinary life, these ideas of self and person are never very definite or 
determinate. Yet he dismisses the issue by concluding that "it is absurd 
therefore to imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt ourselves and 
external objects."8 Thus Hume concludes that our senses are unable to give 
us any notion of continued existence, since 
They cannot operate beyond the extent in which 
they operate •••• We may therefore conclude with certainty, 
that the opinion of a continued existence never arises 
from the senses.9 
In the Inquiry Hume maintains the s~~e view regarding the senses. He 
has been dealing with the scepticism that arises from science and inquiry. 
The arguments of the sceptics are presented, or, as he terms it, the more 
trite problems presented by the sceptics of all times against the evidence 
of sense, such as the imperfection and fallaciousness of our sense organs 
on many occasions; the crooked appearance of an oar in the water; the 
-
deceptive appearance of objects viewed from various distances, and the double 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Hume, Inquirz, XII,l. 
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image which comes from pressing one eye, and many other similar appearances. 
These arguments of the sceptics 1 according to Hume,, are evidence enough to 
shOW that the senses alone are not to be implicitly depended upon. However, 
he continues, it seams evident that men are carried along by a natural 
impulse to have faith in their senses and that, without reason, we suppose 
there is an external world, which is not dependent upon our perceptions but 
would exist even though no sensible creatures existed. 
But our senses alone cannot give us such knowledge of the external 
world. Thus, he concludes that the senses are incapable of producing an 
opinion of the continued existence of objects. 
Hume now turns his attention to the consideration of reason. He main-
tains that reason is likmvise incapable of producing any opinion concerning 
the objects existing independently of the mind. Here again he presents 
several arguments, which he feels are sufficient to establish his position. 
First, if reason were sufficient, it would, still only be valid for the 
philosophers, and they are but few. Furthermore their views would not 
greatly influence the majority of mankind in general. So that whatever 
convincing arguments philosophers might think they could adduce to confirm 
their belief in the existence of objects independent of the mind, it is quite 
obvious that these arguments would not be able to persuade peasants, children, 
nor the large majority of maru(ind to attribute objects to some of their 
impressions, and yet not to others.10 
10 , Treatise, I,IV,2. 
--------
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Then again~ the view of the philosophers is contrary, in this respect, 
to the view of the vulgar. 
All the conclusions which the vulgar are found to hold concerning objects 
existing independently of the mind are directly contrary to those held by 
philosophers. For the philosophers, according to Hume, maintain that every-
thing which appears is nothing but a perception, and therefore is interrupted 
and independent of the mind; whereas the vulgar, by whom Hume means those 
he has previously described as children, peasants and the majority of mankind, 
contuse what they perceive with the things they feel and which they see have 
a distinct and continued existence. Since, however, this view is unreasonable 
the senttment of the distinct existence of external bodies must come from 
11 
some other faculty besides reason. 
Since reason is the faculty which judges and which enables a philosopher 
to explain his views, the question naturally arises, why does Hume treat 
reason with such brevity, and why does he dismiss it with such ease? The 
answ·er to both of these questions can be gathered by a more complete descrip-
tion of reason as found in his works. There are several statements of Hume 
which show why for him reason is insufficient to give us any notion of 
external objects. 
First, reason is nothing but a kind of sensation. 
All probable reasoning is nothing but a species of 
sensations. It is not solely in poetry and music that 
we must follow our taste and sentL~ent, but likewise in 
11 ~., I, IV, 2. 
I 
I 
I 
philosophy. When I am convinced of any principle 1 it 
· is only an idea which strikes more strongly upon me. 
When I give preference to one set of arguments over 
another, I do nothing but decide my1feeling concerning the superiority of their influence. . 
Hence, all reasoning is just .a matter of feeling. 
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Again, reason is nothing but an "instinct." He describes it as being 
Nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct 
in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of 
ideas, and endows them with particular situations and 
relations .13 
In the light of both of these texts., it becomes evident that to Hum.e 
reason is no criterion of truth1 as far as philosophy is concerned. For 
reason is likened to taste and ~ancy, and is a matter of preference. Reason 
is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct." 
Reason resolves itself into custom. Hume holds that all reasonings 
are nothing but the effects of "custom", and the only influence of this 
custom is that it enlivens the imagination, thus strengthening the conception 
of any object. And he holds that reason is nothing but a matter of "habit". 
which in turn has no influence except to enliven the imagination. In his 
Inquiry he further describes the process of reasoning as follows: 
In all reasonings from experience there is a step 
taken by the mind, which is not supported by any argument 
or process of the understanding; there is no danger that 
these reasonings on which almost all knowledge depends will 
ever be effected by this discovery.l4 
12 ~., I, III, 8. 
13 Ibid • ., I, III, 16. 
14 
--------" Inquiry, V,l. 
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The above statement is followed by several illustrations by which Hume 
attempts to substantiate his description. He cites the exrunple of a person 
coming into the world endowed with the strongest faculties and argues that 
his conclusions concerning the continued succession of objects would be 
merely that they exist, but no further discovery could be made. Now what is 
that step taken by the mind that is not supported either by reason or 
understanding? To this question Hume answers that the principle here in-
volved is simply custom or habit, and his reason seems quite evident. For 
whenever any particular act is repeated, there is always a tendency to repeat 
again, witho~t being impelled by reason or understanding, and whenever this 
takes place, we always say that this tendency is the result of custom. So 
that custom becomes the great guide of life.l5 
Finally, reason is a slave of the passions. Hume feels that we do not 
speak accurately or philosophically when we refer to the conflict between 
passion and reason, for he asserts that 
15 Ibid. 
Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than 
to serve and obey them.l8 
16 , Treatise, II,III,3. 
Smith, 45. Concerning this statement of reason 
as a slave to the passions, Smith states that 
this becomes the maxim of all of Hume's philo-
sophy. 
~----------------~ 
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Thus Hume begins wi~h the senses~ ~howing the lL~itation of the senses 
in solving the problem of the external world. For the senses can produce 
opinion of a distinct existence, but not of a continued existence. Further-
more the senses convey but single impressions, and if the senses were to 
convey any impression of a continued existence it would have to be by way 
of fallacy or illusion. Hence the inadequacy of the senses. 
Reason, however is also insufficient to induce our belief in the 
existence of the external world, for the judgments of reason are contrary to 
the opinions of the vulgar. And even if reason were sufficient it would be 
so only for the few, and not for the majority of mankind. Having shown that 
neither the senses nor reason are sufficient, Hume now turns his attention 
to the imagination, and shows that the opinion held of the distinct and 
continued existence of objects must be due entirely to the imagination. 
Just what does Hume mean by the imagination? Although he does not give 
a precise definition, he does, however, describe the operation of the 
imagination as well as show the distinction within the imagination. 
First, we have Hume's description of the operation of the imagination. 
When any impression has been present with the mind, it appears again as an 
idea, and this may take place in two different ways; either, when it appears 
again~ it retains a considerable degree of its original liveliness, and 
somewhat between an impression or an idea; or when it loses that liveliness 
and remains a perfect idea. The faculty by which the impressiona are 
repeated in the first way is called memory, while the second is called 
imagination. \ It is obvious that the ideas of the memory are more lively and 
strong than those of the imagination, and also that the memory paints its 
r,-------~ 
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objects in more distinct colors than any used by the imagination.l7 
Hume also shows a distinction in the imagination in the operation of 
two principles on at least two different ~evels. 
I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the 
princi9les which are permanent, irresistible, an~ univer-
sal; such as the customary transition from causes to 
effects and fro~ effects to causes; and the principles 
which are changeable, weak and irregular •••• the former 
are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so 
that upon their removal human nature would L~ediately 
perish and go to ruin. The latter are neither unavoid-
able to mankind, nor necessary, or so much as useful 
in the conduct of life; but on the contrary are observed 
to take place only in weak minds, and being opposite 
t~ the principles of custom and reasoning, may be easily 
subverted by a due contrast and opposition. For this 
reason the former are received by philosophy and the 
latter rejected.l8 
In the immediate context Hume illustrates both of these principles. 
The permanent and irresistible principles are evident when anyone concludes 
that somebody is near him, when he hears a definite voice in the dark. He 
reasons justly and naturally, even though his conclusion be derived from 
nothing but custom, which "infixes and enlivens the idea o~human creature, 
on account of his conjunction with the present ~npression."19 
The changeable, weak and irregular principles of the imagination are 
at work ~hen one is tormented for reasons he knows not why, with the 
"apprehension of spectres in the dark, may be perhaps said to reason, and 
to reason naturally too, but then it must be in the same sense that a malady 
17 ~., I,I,3. 
18 ~·• I,IV,4. 
19 Ibid., I,IV,l. 
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is said to be natural; as arising from natural causes, though it be contrary 
lth th t bl d t t 1 •t t• f 20 to hea , e mos agreea e an mos na ura s1 ua 1on o man. 
Hume's third explanation of the imagination deals with tts scope of 
operation, e.nd it is at this point that he show·s the free e.nd almost unbounded 
scope in the operation or the imagination. 
flume's own description is as rollows: 
Nothing is more admirable than the readiness with 
which the ime.gination suggests its ideas and presents them 
at the very instant in which they become necessary or 
useful. The fancy runs rrom one end or the universe ·to 
the other, in collecting those ideas which alone belong 
to any subject. One would think the whole intellectual 
world or ideas was at once subjected to our view, and 
that we did nothing but pick out such as were most proper 
for our purpose. There may not, however, be any present, 
besides those very ideas, that are thus collected by a kind 
of magical faculty of the soul, which though it be always 
perfect in the greatest geniuses, and is properly what 
we call genius, is, however, inexpl~yable by the utmost 
efforts or the human understanding. 
Thus, to Hume, the imagination see.ms to possess the capacity of 
suggestion as well as choice, and though that power is perrect in the genius, 
it is nevertheless inexplicable by the human understanding. 
Having considered Hume's explanation or the Lmagination, including his 
description, the distinction within the operation of the imagination, as well 
as its scope, we now turn to consider the emphasis he places upon the imagina-
tion. He rurther develops his position, that the ~.agination provides the 
basis ror our belief in the external world, by a three-rold emphasis. 
20 Ibid., I, IV,4. 
21 Ibid., I,I,7. 
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First, since all impressions are internal and perishing existences, the 
notion of their distinct and continued existence must arise from a con-
currence of some of their qualities with the qualities of the imagination.22 
As all our im.pressions are internal, that is subjective, and appearing 
that way, the notion of their disti~ct and continued existence must come 
from the comparison of those impressions to which we attribute a distinct 
and continued existence, with those which we regard as internal and perish.:. 
. 23 
~ng. 
Hume likewise maintains that we cannot attribute continued existence 
to involuntariness and superior force and violence. Since it is neither 
because of the involuntariness of certain impressions, as is commonly 
supposed, he asserts, nor because of th~ superior force and viblence that 
we hole that they have a continued existence, which we do not attribute to 
others that are more feeble and voluntary. For it is obvious that we never 
suppose our passions and affections, pleasures and pains, to have an 
existence b'eyond our perception, although they act with greater violence and 
are also involuntary.24 
In Hume' s third and final emphasis .upon the imagination, re h9lds that 
there are two qualities, in our i."Tlpressions which make us attribute to them 
a·distinct and continued existence, namely constancy and coherence. Just a 
22 Ibid., r,rv,7. 
23 Ibid., r, rv, 2. 
24 Ibid. 
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little investigation will show that all objects to which we attribute a 
continued existence have a peculie.r constancy which distinguishes them from 
the impressions which exist because of our perception. He continues his 
argument by way of illustration. 
The mountains, houses, and trees which Hume sees have always appeared 
to him in the se.me order. Whe.:n he loses sight of them by shutting his eyes 
or by turning his head, he soon finds them returning to him without any 
alteration. The same is true of his bed, his books, and papers which also 
present themselves to him in the same way, and they do not change because 
of any interruption or because of his not seeing them. Thus, Hume reasons, 
happens in the case of all those :Lrnpressions wr.ose objects are supposed to 
exist externally.25 
Still this constancy is not so perfect as not to admit of change and 
certain exceptions. These exceptions Hume defines by coherence, by which 
the changes are dependent upon each other. Once more he illustrates this 
point. If after an hour's absence, he returns to his chamber, he finds the 
fire not as when he left it. He is accustomed to seeing other changes 
whether he is present or absent, near at hand is one of the characteristics 
of external objects as well e.s their constancy.26 
He now turns to the question of the relationship of constancy and 
coherence to the opinion of the continued existence of bodies. Although 
internal impressions also involve coherence, it is not necessa.r;,r from them 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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to conclude the existence of external bodies~ Outer impressions, however, 
require a supposed external existence; otherwise they lose the regularity 
of their operation. Ee finds hi.TJlself e.ge.in seated in his chamber, by the 
fire, his face to the fire, e.nd all the objects that strike his senses are 
within a fsw yards of him. His memo~J does not inform him, to be sure, of 
the existence of many objects, but that information does not go be;olond their 
past existence, nor do his senses or memorJr give any evidence of the con-
tinuance of being. Vmile sitting and reflecting on these thoughts, he hears 
a sudden noise e.s though the door were moving toward him. This, of course, 
gives opportunity for many nevr reflections and reasonings. First of all, 
he had never thought that this noise could possibly come from anything but 
the motion of the door. Thus it would contradict all past experience unless 
the door he hears be actually the one he remembers being on the other side 
of the chamber.27 
Other factors, of course, are included. The human body has the quality 
of gravity, and there must be stairs for the porter to mount. So when the 
porter hands him e. letter which he perceives by the handwriting and sub-
scription to come from a friend who says he is two hundred leagues distant, 
he is sure he cannot account for this phenomenon, like to his experience in 
other instances, without spreading out in the mind the whole sea and 
continent between us, and supposing the effects and continued existence of 
posts e.nd ferries, in the light of his memory end observation. 
27 Ibid. 
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At eveiJr moment of his life similar instances are presented to him in. 
which he must suppose the continued existence of objects, otherwise his 
experiences cannot be made consistent with themselves. ~~at makes this 
supposition possible? Hume answers his own question by replying that custom, 
though vital and involved, is not sufficient alone. Other factors are also 
operating. The i.'tl1agination, as Hume has already observed in mathematics, 
when it is set in any particular train of thought, is apt to continue even 
when its object fails it. For the imagination operates 
Like a galley slave put in motion by the oars, 
carries its course without any new i.mpulse •••• The same 
principle makes us easily to 2Bntertain the opinion of the continued existence of body. 
From this description of Hume, there seems to be in the imagination 
an impulsive drive that moves the imagination on, once it has begun to 
operate in any given situation. Now no matter how much emphasis Hume has 
pl~ced upon coherence, he will not let himself hold that coherence alone is 
sufficient, for he confesses its inadequacy in the following manner: 
/ 
I a"Yl afraid it (coherence) is too weak to support 
. along so vast an edifice as is the.~ of the continued 
existence of all external bodies.2 
It is at this point that Hmn.e reaches the climax of his e.rgument. We 
now know why we attribute a continued existence to objects, even when they 
are not present to the senses, and also why we believe them to have an 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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existence distinct from the mind and perception. It is because of this 
principle of coherence, vnlich Hume adknowledges is not too plausible. He 
must therefore give a more positive explanation of the role of the imagina-
tion in producing this belief in the externkl world. 
However, he feels that the explanation of this position involves a 
considerable compass of profound reasoning, and in short, to avoid confusion, 
he thinks it proper to give a short sketch or abridgement of what he calls 
11my system. 11 
He now describes his thesis, which he terms as his own system, in 
contrast to both the vi~¥ of other philosophers, as well as the position of 
the vulgar. It is the following opinion: 
The opinion of the continued existence of body, 
which is prior to that of its definite existence, and 
produces the latter principle.30 
i'Jhat does Hu.rne mean by the word, principle? He has already· stated the 
impossibility of knowing either universal or ultimate principles. Yl'hat then 
does he mean? He explains his use of the word principle later in the same 
paragraph, as "this supposition, or idea, of continued existence."31 In 
other words, to Rume, a principle means merely a supposition or idea. And 
since ideas are but faint images of previous impressions, they can be neither 
ultimate nor universal principles, but merely relative to the situation 
involved at any given moment. 
ZO Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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Hume then presents a brief outline of his argument, followed by the 
four main arguments for his posit,ion, which include: the principle of 
individuation; the reason why the resemblance of our broken and interrupted 
perceptions induce us to attribute identity to them; the explanation of 
that propensity, ·which this illusion gives to unite these broken ·appearances 
by a continued existence; and the explanation of the force and vivacity of 
conception which arises from this propensity. 
He first presents his argument in outline. The perceptions of the sun, 
or ocean, v.tich returr.., after an absence or a:r..nihilat::on witl'_ like parts, 
and in like order, we are likely to regard as different. However, the 
interruptedness is felt to be difficult. In order to free ourselves fron 
this difficulty, we disguise the interruptedness as much as possible, or 
else remove it altogether, by supposing that these interrupted perceptions 
are connected by a real existence of which we are sensible. Hume concludes 
this argument with the following s~ary: 
This supposition, or idea of continued existence, 
acquires a force,. and vivacity from the memory of these 
unbroken L-npressions, and from the natural tendency to 
suppose them to be the same; and according to the past 
reasoning, the very essence of belief consists in the 
force and liveliness of the conception.32 
The four main arguments for Hume's position follow. First, the 
principle of individuation. 
The viev: we have of any single object is not sufficient to convey the 
idea of identity, for one single object conveys the idea of unity, but not 
32 Ibid. 
r 
' 
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of identity. A nu.rnber of objects can never convey this idea., however much 
they :nay be supposed to resemble each other. Since then both nu.mber and uni-
ty are incompatible with the relation of identity, the latter must lie in 
something that is .neither of them. But t!lis seems at i'irst sight impossible, 
since between number and ~nity, there can be no medium. To solve this 
difficulty Hume refers once more to the time factor, or duration. Time has 
reference to succession and ;vhen applied to any unchangeable object. The 
only way it is possible for any unchangeable object to 1::·e supposed to parti-
cipate in the changes of co-existent objects, and particularly in that of 
our ~Jerceptions, is by a fiction of the imagination. Hume feels that this 
fiction does not universally take place, and only thus is it possible that 
a single object placed before us, and observed for any length of time without 
our discovery of any variation or interruption in it, is able to give a. 
notion of identity. He concludes this argument on the principle of indivi-
dua.tion as follows: 
The principle of individuation is nothing but the 
inva.ria.bleness and uninterruptedness of any object, through 
a. supposed variation of ti.rne, which the mind can trace it 
in different periods of its existence, without any break 
of the view, and without being obliged to form any idea 
of multiplicity of number.33 
The second argument involves the reason why the resemblance of our 
broken and interrupted perceptions induces us to attribute an identity to 
them. 
33 Ibid. 
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In presenting this argument, Hume again takes the position of the vulgar 
in order, as he feels, to avoid all ambiguit;r and confusion. Here again the 
imagination is vital in the explanation. Once more Hume finds hLmself in 
:-tis cha"!lber surve:>ring his furniture. He shuts his eyes and after a while 
opens them again, whereupon he finds new perceptions to resemble perfectly 
i 
those which formerly struck his sen~es. This resemblance is observed, 
according to Hume, in a thousand instances, and naturally together with these 
ideas of those interrupted perceptions by the strongest relations, enables 
the mind to pass from one to another vvith an easy transition. The whole of 
t:lis phenomenon he explains by means of the operation of the L"!lagination. 
This he s~arizes in the following brief but Lmportant paragraph: 
An easy transition or passage of the imagination 
along the ideas of these different and uninterrupted 
perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind with 
that in which we consider one constant and uninterrupted 
perception. It is therefore very natural to mistake the 
one for the other.34 
In a footnote to the above explanation, Hume admits that his reasoning 
is somewhat abstruse and difficult to understand, but he Lrnm.ediately contends 
that this ve~J difficulty can be converted into a proof in favor of his 
argwnent, for he shows that there are two different relationships at work, 
both of which are resemblances. The first of these is the resemblance of 
perceptions. Vfuile the second is the resemblance 
34 Ibid. 
1fuich the act of the mind in surveying a succession 
of resembling objects bears to that in surveying an 
identical object. Now these resemblances we are apt to 
confound with each other; and it i~ natural we should 
according to this very reasoning.3 
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He concludes his second argument with a still further explanation of 
the operation of the imagination. Here he shows how, by the smooth passage 
of the imagination along the ideas of resembling perceptions~ we are easily 
led to ascribe to the.m-a perfect identity. The interrupted map_~er in which 
they appear makes us consider them as so many resembling but still distinct~ 
beings, appearing after certain intervals. We find ourselves perplexed by 
this contradiction~ and thus have a certain tendency to untie these broken 
appearances by the fiction of a continued existence.36 
The third argument considers the account for that propensity which 
t~is illusion gives~ to unite these broken appearances by a continued 
existence. 
Hume makes clear that the real issue is not concerning the matter of 
fact, that is, whether the mind actually forms a conclusion from its 
perceptions, but only regarding the way in "'l:tlich the conclusion is reached~ 
and the principles from which it is derived. He feels sure that ahtost all 
of mankind, including philosophers themselves~ for the large part of their 
lives, take their perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose that 
the very being which is then present to the mind is actue.lly the real body 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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of material existence. Hume is also sure that this perception or object is 
assumed to have a continued and uninterrupted existence 6 and not to be 
annihilated by our absence, nor to be brought again into existence by our 
presence. '.\ben we are not present with it~ we still say it exists 6 even 
though we do not feel it or see it, vmile when we are present we say we see 
it and we feel it.37 
The fourth and final argument deals with the explanation of the force 
and vivacity of conception which arises from the propensity. He believes 
that an intelligent reader will find it easier to accept his system than to 
understand it fully and distinctly, and will after a while with little 
reflection admit that every part of his argument carries its own proof along 
with it. He feels it is obvious, as the vulgar suppose, that their 
perceptions are their only objects, yet at the same time they believe the 
continued existence of matter~ that is upon the basis of the supposition 
that we must account for the origin of this belief. 
Based upon this supposition6 it is a false opinion that any of our 
objects or perceptions are identically the same after their interruptions, 
and consequently the opini:Jn of their identity can never arise from reason6 
but must necessarily arise from the imagination. The only way the imagina-
tion is seduced into such an opinion is because of the resemblance of certain 
perceptions, which we have a tendency to suppose the s~me. This tendency 
37 Ibid. 
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to consider our resembling perceptions identical results in the fiction of 
a continued existence 1 since that fiction as well as the identity is 
actually false, as all philosophers acknowledge. And thus it has no other 
effect than to remedy ~1e interruption of our perceptions, which is the 
only condition that is contrary to their identity.38 
Tnus we find Iiume's solution to the problem of the external world to 
be based not on sensation, nor on reason1 but rather on the belief in the 
distinct existence of the world in the imagination. 
• 
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CHAPTER III 
THE P..EASOUS FOR HU11E 1 S POSIT IOU 
iVhat are some of the reasons for Hume's position, and how did he arrive 
at his conclusions? In this chapter we shall deal with these questions, in 
a consideration of the claim of Hume to originality, ~s well as the influe 
of other philosophers upon his thought. For Hume is not alone in his 
theory of knowledge. Other thinkers before him influenced his position, 
particularly Locke and Berkeley. Hume follows Locke, who is more consistent 
than Berkeley. 
Hume claims for himself a certain amount of originali~J• He refers to 
n t nl his system of philosophy, as my sys em. Also when referring to the 
imagination as the ultimate judge of all philosophy, he begins with the 
statement, "according to my philosophy. "2 Furthermore in the Introduction 
to the Treatise, he professes to be establishing "a complete system of 
sciences, built upon foundation~ almost entirely new."3 
That other philosophers influenced Hume is evident from a comparison 
of the works of other writers who preceded him, as well as his own 
references and also acknowledgements to other men. Although no doubt, 
1 Hume, Treatise, I,IV,2. 
2 Ibid., I,IV,3. 
3 Ibid., Introduction. 
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many thinkers influenced Hume, consideration here is given only to those 
\~10 seem most directly involved, the chief of these, being John Locke and 
George Berkeley. As is to be expected, Hume admits the influence of other 
thinkers upon his thought. 
The first of these references is found in the Introduction to the 
Treatise, where Hume remarks that N~. Locke (who is given consideration 
later in this chapter), my Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. :Mandeville, Mr. Hutcheson, 
Dr. Butler, etc. had indeed commenced a great work, to which he feels his 
own work will be a contribution.4 
4 Ibid. 
Hendel. In Chapter III, 95, Hendel s~~arizes the 
influence of the above named writers upon 
Hum.e. 
Their preoccupation was almost entirely 
with the life of sentL~ent and morals. 
Shaftesbury studied the Characteristics 
of ]!J:en, Manners, Opinions, Times • 
Mandeville likened man to animals in his 
Fables of the Bees. Hutcheson started 
his career with an Inquiry into the Original 
of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, deploring 
in his preface the almost universal in-
terest of philosophers in the understanding -
hence his later work, An Essay on the Nature 
of the Passions and Affections. Jl~d Bishop 
Butler gave to the world his Sermons on 
Nature, portraying man as fundamentally a 
creature of impulse like the animals and 
achieving moral excellence only by "con-
science," which is a wise reflection upon 
the complete meaning of our personal life. 
r 
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Hume was also influenced by what he himself describes as "the 
}Jewtonian Philosophy. "5 However, this single reference to Nevrton is not 
alone in indicating Hume's indebtedness to him, for his whole approach by 
way of e:xperiment is newtonian. In his Introduction to the Treatise, he 
describes this method of experiment: 
Vfuen I am at a loss to know the effects of one 
body upon another in any situation, I need only put 
them in any situation, and observe what results from 
it.S 
There remains still another aspect in which Hume was influenced by 
}Jewton; in his proposal to develop a static and dyna..-rnics of the mind, 
modelled on the pattern of the newtonian physics, and in which the associa-
tion of' ideas is conceived as Hume describes it, by 
A kind of attraction, which in the mental world 
will be fom1d to have as extraordinary effects as in 
the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as 
various forms.7 
The influence of Father Malebranche is also evidenced in Hume's 
6 ~., Introduction. 
Smith describes the influence of Newton upon Hume 
in the following manner when he states: "Hume 
contrives to combine reliance on experiment with 
the conviction that the ultL~ate secrets of nature 
are permanently witheld from human view. Experi-
ments, Hume teaches, is the final court of appeal 
in all matters of fact." 
7 ~., I,I,4. and also Smith, 71. 
analysis of cause and effect, so well sunrnarized by Gilson: 
Hume a?pl2ed his analysis to the idea of cause 
and effect, with the result that he could find 
nothing essential in that idea, but a relation of 
contiguity, or succession between what we call cause 
and effect ••••• 1~at is there in our mind, for instance, 
which answers to the word, efficacy? Malebranche, 
to whom Hume himself expressly refers at this point, 
had conclusively proved that no philosopher has ever 
been able to explain the so-called "secret force and 
energy of causes."8 
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It is likewise evident that the writings of Cicero had influenced 
Hume, ~1ich he aQ~its in a letter, dated on September 17, 1739, while still 
engaged in the completion of his Treatise.9 
In Thomas Hobbes, Hume had already seen evidence of the place and 
10 
importance of the :imaginetion. 
8 Gilson, The Unity~ ~lilosophical Experience., 216 and 217. 
9 Charles W. Hendel, Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume., Princeton 
University Press, 1925, 91.-- -
Hume writes: I had indeed the former book (Cicero's 
Offices) in MY eye in all my reasonings. And in the 
same letter - You are a great aQ~irer or Cicero as 
well as I am. Please to review the fourth book of 
De Finnibus et Malorum. 
10 Ibid., 75. In referring to Hobbes' influence on Hume, he writes: 
ThO:mas Hobbes was another figure in whose v~itings Hume had already 
discovered a fallacious argument to prove the necessity of a cause 
for every event •••• Hobbes saw in the activity of the senses that of 
the imagination is the most significant capacity of our human mind. 
It gives rise to both single and compound thoughts. When we direct 
our imagination by means of words or other vocabulary signs, we have 
that special phase of mind we call mental discourse or understanding. 
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One cannot consider the thinkers who influenced Hume without including 
Francis Bacon. Hendel presents considerable evidence to indicate that some 
of Hume's scepticism was no doubt derived from Bacon. In his work, 
The Great Instauration, Bacon avows himself an improved Academic Sceptic. 
To hLm the sceptical attitude is a state of mind preparatory to a methodical 
knowledge, and doubt defends philosophy against error, for it calls attention 
to what needs to be considered more carefully. He vigorously defends the 
method of experiment and holds that we are to trust the first deliverances of 
the senses. Thus Bacon mainte.ins that the natural judgment of man upon his 
perception is right. The chief task, according to Bacon, becomes the ability 
to produce data of our knowledge by investigation and experiment. 11 
Though these other thinkers, no doubt, influenced Hume, the most direct 
and definite influence upon Hume's thought was the influence of Locke and 
Berkeley, whom we now consider. 
Before considering the influence of Locke and Berkeley upon Hume, it is 
notevvorthy that Locke, in turn, was greatly influenced by Descartes. In 
fact Locke's own account of his debt to Descartes is clearly revealed in a 
letter to Stillingfleet, who had inferred that Locke was not original in his 
11 ~., 40 and 41. 
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essay, but had rather shown undue dependence upon Descartes.12 
This is in complete agreement with the account Lady Masham gives of 
her conversation with Locket 
The first books, as Locke himself told me, which 
gave hlln a relish of philosophical things, were those 
of Descartes. He rejoiced in reading them, because, 
though he often differed in opinion from this writer, 
yet he found what he said ve~J intelligible.l3 
Thus, though Locke attributes his philosophical awakening to Descartes, 
though he differs from h:L11 in many respects, still, "the whole conception of 
idee.s as proper objects of knowledge is Cartesian in origin. nl4 
Pringle-Pattison agrees with this view, and states that the whole of 
modern philosophy may be said to begin with the subjective note of Descartes. 
12 James Gibson, Locke's Theory ~ Knowledge ~ Its Historical Relations. 
Cambridge University Press, 1917, 205. 
13 ~·· 206. 
Locke replied: "Though I must acknowledge to that 
justly a~~ired gentleman, the great obligation 
of my first deliverance from the unintelligible 
way of talking philosophy in use in the schools 
of his time, yet I am far from entitling his 
-v.rritings to any of the errors of imperfections 
which are found in my essay, as deri::ving their 
original from him that I must own to your lord-
ship they were spun barely out of my own mind, 
and the ideas I had there, were not, that I know, 
derived from any other original. 11 
14 Ibid., 207. For full account, see the whole of Chapter IX, entitled 
Locke and Descartes. 
His celebrated and much praised starting-point is 
in reality a false, or at all events an inadequate 
foundation for philosophy, for it apparently affirms 
the independent existence of that which, when separated 
from the world, cannot be otherwise regarded than a mere 
abstraction. As Descartes describes it, 'I exist, how 
often? As often as I think. For perhaps it would even 
happen, if I should wholly cease to think, that I should 
at the sa~e time altogether cease to be.' In other words, 
thinking, then, is whereby I exist, or as Descartes 
expressed it, I am a being whose essence consists in 
thinking.l5 
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However, it is well to rem~nber that whatever differences there are 
be~reen Descartes and Locke concerning innate ideas, "they are at one in the 
funda.:mental poL"'lt that the sole object of the mind's knowledge is its own 
.d "16 ~ eas. 
Locke is not concerned with the difficulties regarding either the 
general nature of the mind, nor the special mechanism of perception. These, 
he feels, are matters of speculation and out of reach.17 
His first purpose is to rejec~ the hypothesis of innate ideas, and in 
place of these ideas, he holds that the mind is 
15 
16 
17 
18 
At first perfectly rasa tabula, quite void, but 
altogether capable of those characteristics, notions or 
ideas, which are the proper objects of our understandings 
wherein our knowledge consists, and beJrond which we have 
not any knowledge at all.l8 
Pringle Pattison, Scottish Philosophy. ! Comparison~~ Scottish 
and German Answers to Hume. William Blackwood and Sons, London, 1899,9,10 
James Orr, David Hume and His Influence 2E. Philosophy~ Theology• 
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1903, 37. 
John Locke, An Ess2y Concerning_ Human Understanding. William Tegg ~: Co., 
London, 1853, I,I, • 
Ibid. 
r 51 
Here Locke differs from Descartes, who taught that from the very nature 
of our mind, it followed necessarily that ideas are innate. What ideas did 
Descartes mean? The first principles of all being and of thought, such as 
for exa~ple, what is, is; and that the same thing cannot be and not be at 
the same time• To which Locke replied, that children, idiots, and even 
normal men die without ever knowing those principles. Still they have 
souls and minds, and how could those notions be imprinted upon their minds 
without their knowing them? So Locke concludes that no ideas are innate, 
not even the idea of God. It is at this point that Gilson remarks that the 
fate of Cartesian philosophy is a settled thing. For Descartes had held 
that it is necessary for the soul always to think, and if necessary, it 
ought always to be. However, the soul no more always thinks, than the 
body moves at all ti"!les. Even to state that the soul is nothing but a 
thinking substance is not even evident, for the soul not only thinks, but 
also wills, and has the power of putting the body into motion, that is 
t . •t 19 mo J.VJ. y. 
Having shown that there are no innate ideas, Locke proceeds to show 
that the two and only two foundations of all knowledge are experience and 
obser.vation. 
19 Gilson, ~Unity~ Philosouhical Experience, 167-169. 
l 
Thus I think that all our knowledge is founded on 
and ultimately derives itself from experience and 
observation, employed either about external, sensible 
objects, or the internal operations of our minds, 
perceived by ourselves; which are the two originals 
and fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas 
we have, or can have, do spring.20 
Since our minds have no innate ideas, how then do we arrive at 
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knowledge? Locke answers that if we exfu~ine our ideas we find that they 
all come fromtwo main sources, n~~ely sensations and reflection. Ideas of 
reflection are such as perceiving, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning 
and willing, and in general all ideas which are not sensible are ideas of 
reflection, whereas ideas of sensation depend wholly upon our senses. Thus 
Locke describes how these ideas come into being. 
Our senses are conversant about particular sensible 
objects, do convey into the mind several distinct ideas 
of images of things, according to those various ways where-
in those objects affect them. P~d thus we come by those 
ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, hard, soft, 
ache, smart, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call 
sensible qualities. And this great source of most of the 
ideas we have depending wholly upon our senses and derived 
by them to our understanding, I call sensation.21 
Hume agrees with Locke that all the data of the human mind consists 
in reflections and sensations. He does, however, disagree with Locke as to 
the meaning of impressions and ideas. The basic difference goes back to 
his full disagreement with Locke on the question of innate ideas. This 
variance with Locke is of such importance that Rume gives considerable 
20 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II,I,2. 
21 ~·• II, I,3. 
analysis of his view concerning innate ideas. The reasons for his 
disagreement with Locke are clearly presented in the Inquirv in the 
following analysis : 
For what is meant by innate? If innate be 
equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and 
ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or 
natural, in whatever sense we take tl."te latter word, 
whether in opposition to what is uncommon, artificial, 
or miraculous. If by innate is meant, contemporary to 
our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it 
worthy to enquire at what tL~e thinking begins, whether 
before, at, or after our birth. Again the word idea 
seems to be conunonly taken in a very loose sense by 
Locke and others; as standing for any of our perceptions, 
our sensations and :Passions, as well as thoughts. Now 
in this sense I should desire to know what can be meant 
by asserting that self-love, or resentment of injuries, 
or the passion between the sexes is not innate? 
But admitting these terms, impressions and ideas, 
in the sense above explained, and understanding by 
innate what is original or copied from no precedent 
perception, then may we assert that all our impressions 
are innate, and our ideas not innate.22 
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Thus instead of making our ideas stand for all of our perceptions, 
Hume clearly states that all of our perceptions are impressions. In a 
footnote to this exposition, Hume definitely describes this break with the 
position of Locke. 23 He further admits that his theory of impressions 
22 Hume, Inquiry, I,2. 
23 , Treatise, I,I,l. In a footnote HQ~e makes the following 
state.menti I here make use of these terms, L~pressions and ideas, in 
a different sense from what is usual, and I hope this liberty will be 
allowed me. Perhaps I had rather restorethe word idea to its original 
sense, from which Mr. Locke had perverted it, in making it stand for 
our perceptions. By the term of impression, I would not be understood 
to express the manner in which our lively perceptions are produced in 
the soul, but merely the perceptions themselves; for which there is no 
particular name in the English, or any other language that I know. 
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is singular, in that it has not been held before.24 
Locke continues to describe the ideas of sensation. As they come 
into the mind they are simple, and never confused, or complex, while all 
those ideas not s,imple are claimed by Locke to be compounded of simple 
ideas.25 
After thus desc~ibing how ideas come into the mind, Locke proceeds to 
consider the relationship between the ideas and the objects of which they 
are ideas. Here he finds it necessary to draw an important distinction 
between the two kinds of simple ideas. Some of them are of primary 
qualities, and these resemble qualities which in reality belong to the 
object. By quali~J Locke means the power which a subject has to produce 
an idea in the mind. These si~ple ideas of prL~ary quality involve 
solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest and number; vmereas simple 
ideas of secondary qualities are those without which are really nothing 
in the objects themselves, but only powers, wb.ich the objects have to 
produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities. In these 
Locke includes.colors, sounds, and tastes, which he thinks are produced in 
24 Smith~ The Philosophy of David Hume, 104. Smith remarks that "For 
the term 'impression,' liume is himself responsible." 
25 Locke, Essal•• II,I,24. The following is Locke~ description of all 
knowledge: =.:chis then is the original of all knowledge, e.nd the first 
capacity of humen intellect - that the mind is fitted to receive the 
i~pressions made upon it; either through the senses by outward objects, 
or by its o1vn operations when it reflects on them. This is the first 
step a man takes toward the discovery of anything, and the groundwork 
~~ereon to build all those notions vniich ever we shall have. And ell 
those sublime trcoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high 
as heaven itself, take their rise and footing there. 
us by the bulk, figure, texture and motion of the insensible parts of 
objects.26 
Thus Locke holds to the doctrine that the mind has only knowledge 
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of its ovm ideas, 1ghile ·at the sa..."'lle time, i:c order to e.ccount for these 
ideas, Locke posits a world of objects beyond consciousness. How Locke 
could hold that the mind has only the knowledge of its ov;n idee.s, end at 
the same time maintain that there exist a world of objects beyond our con-
sciousness, is indeed difficult to understand ~nd presents a real probl~1. 
Eume realized this problem and thus maintained that the external world of 
objects is a matter of belief, but not.of knowledge. 27 
For Locke, the knowledge of the externe.l world, is derived wholly 
from sensation. Therefore his po~ition might well be termed that of a 
sensist. How then does he account for the objects existing by themselves? 
26 C. R. I;~rris,. Locke, Berkeley, e.nd Hume. Oxford University Press, 1937, 
32 and 33. 
27 Orr, David~~.!:!.!!, Influence ~ Philosophl ~ Theologl• 90. 
Concerning the problem £'acing Locke, that the mind has only the know-
ledge o~ its own ideas, e..nd yet there exists a world of objects beyond 
our consciousness, Professor Orr pertinently asks: ~That is the warrant 
for this assumption? H~v can an idea which is wholly in the mind, 
yield us the knowledge of an object without the mind, or tell us any-
thing of its nature? ••••• If reliance is placed upon the principle of 
causation, it is easy to retort, as v.as done by both Berkeley and Hume, 
that causation gives no title to infer resemblance, end in the case of 
pr:imary any more than of secondary qualities. Hume adds that the whole 
procedure is illegit:imate, and going beyond experience. 
r 
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This leads directly to hJ.s analysis of substance. V'fhen we perceive, 
we are aware of si~ple ideas of primary and secondary qualities. However, 
we cannot imagine that the qualities of which these ideas are ideas, can 
subsist in and of themselves. Therefore we are accustomed to suppose some 
substratum which we call substance. What then is our idea of·substance in 
general? To which Locke replies: 
If anyone examines himself concerning his notion of 
substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of 
it at all, but only a supposition he knows not what, to sup-
port such qualities which are capable of producing sLmple 
ideas in us •••• The idea, then, to which we give the general 
name of substance, being nothing but the supposed but 
unknown support of those qualities we find existing which 
we Lmagine cannot subsist, without something to support 
them; we call that support, substantia, which e..ccording to 
the true ~port of the word, is, in plain English, 
"standing under," or "upholding." 28 
But here another question arises, how do v:e come to have specific 
ideas about substance? Locke answers: 
Our specific ideas of substance are nothing but a 
collection of a certe.in number of simple ideas, considered 
as united in one thing. These ideas of substance, though 
they are commonly called 'sLmple apprehension,' and the 
names of them 'simple terms,' are conplex and compounded. 29 
Locke continues by way of example. The idea that an Englis!unan has of 
the name swan signifies white, color, neck, long, red beak and black legs, 
of a certain size with the power to swLm in the water, all of them united 
in one common object, swan. Therefore Locke concludes that substance is 
28 Locke, II,XXIII,2. 
29 ~·• II,XXIII, 14. 
r 
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really unknown to us. Later Hume holds the same position, for he raises 
the question, "whether the idea of substance is derived from the impressions 
of sensation or reflection?"30 If, according to the senses, b~.r which one? 
But since this is not possible, Rume continues his argument, the idea of 
substance must come from some impression of reflection. But as all such 
impressions are either in the passions or emotions, neither of which are 
adequate to represent a substance, we must conclude, that we have no idea 
of substance distinct from that of a collection of partioular qualities.31 
One other importent influence of Locke upon H'l.lJ:le is found in his 
treatment of knowledge. For to Locke, knowledge is nothing but 
The perception of the connection and agreement, or 
disagreement and repugnancy of any of our 1deas. In 
this alone it consists. Where t!cis perception is, there 
is knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we may 
fancy, gues~ or believe, yet we always come short of 
knowledge.3 
Hume likewise maintains that knowledge is only in the comparison of 
ideas, for he admits that he defines knowledge as those philosophers who 
consider it, "to be that evidence which arises from the comparison of ideas,' 
and in the same paragraph he further emphasizes his positioh in the followin 
description, that, "by knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the 
30 Hume, Treatise, I,I,6. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Locke, IV,I,2. 
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comparison of idea.s."33 
Locke further describes the different degrees of knowledge, and the 
distinction is clearly seen, in "the different clearness of our knowledge, 
which seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has of 
the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas."34 
The description of the three different degrees of knowledge, continues. 
There is, first of all, intuitive knowledge in ~ich the mind perceives the 
agreement or disagre~ent of two ideas, Urnnedia.tely, that is wit~out the 
intervention of any other. For exa~ple, that white is not blaok, and that a. 
circle is not a triangle. This intuitive knowledge Locke describes as 
Irresistible, and like bright sunshine, forces itself 
immediately to be perceived a.s soon a.s ever the mind turns 
its view that we.~; and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, 
or examination.35 
All certainty depends upon this intuitive knowledge, and it is so 
great, that no one can conceive himself capable of a greater certainty than 
the knowledge that any idea in his mind is such as he perceives it to be, 
and no other. To this Locke adds another sentence that leads rig~t into the 
center of Hume' s scepticism, for he says, 
He that demands greater certainty than this, demands 
he knows not what, and shows only that he has a mind to be 
a. sceptic, without being able to do so.36 
33 Hume, Treatise, I,III,ll. 
34 Locke, IV,II,l. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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Hence once more- Hume agrees with Locke that the only knowl$dge that 
involves certainty is intuitive knowledge- which includes those relations 
Depending solely upon ideas, which can be the objects 
of knowledge and certainty. These four are resemblance-
contrariety_ degrees in qulity, and proportions in quantity 
and number. Three of these relations are discoverable at 
first sight, and fall more pronerly under the province of 
i~tuition than demonstration.37 
These three discoverable at first sight include resemblance, contra-
riety- e.nd degrees of any quality. In the fourth relationship Hume 
distinguishes between Arithmetic and Algebra, in contrast to Geometry, where 
appearances are involved. The other three relations are not intuitive_ 
therefore they do not give certainty_ neither are they objects of kn~ledge~8 
The second degree of knowledge, according to Locke, involves demonstra-
tive knowledge where the mind proceeds to discover agreement or disagreement 
of two ideas by the intervention of other ideas. However- each step in this 
demonstration must have intuitive evidence, since without such perception 
no knowledge can arise. Mathematics is capable of this demonstrative 
certainty. Hume also agrees with this position.39 
HOwever, it is in the third degree of knowledge that Locke's strongest 
influence upon Hume is clearly seen. For this third degree, which is 
sensitive knowledge, only goes under the name of knowledge, but does not 
reach the certainty of the first two degrees of knowledge. It consists in 
37 Hume, Treatise, I,III,l. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Locke, IV, II,2. 
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"the perception of the mind concerning the particular existence of finite 
beings without it."40 Locke further states that, as to whether there be 
anything more than the ideas in our minds, that of external existing bodies, 
corresponding to our ideas, some men doubt. But concerning the existence 
of bodies in general he holds that doubt is unreasonable, because of the 
clear difference between the idea of sense, and an idea of memory or llnagina-
tion.41 
Hume likewise holds that there is a difference between perception and 
the memory or imagination, and that difference is one of feeling, but that 
does not necessarily prove the independent existence of a physical world.42 
Moreover, Hume also holds that the existence of the external world, also 
must be .taken for granted; for 
We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in 
the existence of body? but it is vain to ask, Whether there 
be body or not? That is a point which we must take for 
granted in all our reasonings.43 
Thus the relationship and influence of Locke upon Hume is evident in 
Locke's statement that all knowledge comes out of experience and observation; 
that all that is included in knowledge involves sensation and reflection, 
40 ~·• IV,II,14. 
41 Ibid. 
42 JIIJ.Orris, Locke, Berkeley, and ~·· 46. 
43 Hume, Treatise, I,IV,2. 
r 
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and tha~ the mind has only the knowledge of its own ideas. Furthermore 1 to 
Locke, as to Hume, the real nature of substance is unknown 1 and Locke finds 
himself in equal difficulty in dealing with the self. Furthermore his 
statement that mathematics is capable of certainty, as well as his distinc-
tion between perception and the imagination, indicate his relationship to 
Hume. 
That Hume was greatly influenced by Locke is also expressed by that 
Humian authority, Hendel, in the following summary: 
The writings of John Locke were i;mnensely important 
for Hume ••••• Their influence upon European thought had 
come to be very great, pervading the literature of the 
ti~e. It was authoritative for Hume as well as others.44 
From Locke it is but a step to the consideration of Berkeley's influence 
upon Hume. The opening statement of Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledg~ 
not only expresses his own view as to our knowledge of the external world~ 
but also clearly presents evidence for his first influence upon Hume. 
It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the 
·objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas 
actually imprinted upon the senses; or else such as are 
perceived by attending to the passions and operations of 
the mind; or, lastly, ideas formed by the help of memory 
and i~agination - either compounding, dividing, or barely 
representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid 
ways.45 
In these three divisions of the objects of knowledge are found all of 
Hume's perceptions. The first two, sense-ideas, and the ideas of the pas-
sions and operations of the mind1 include Hume's impressions, whereas the 
44 Hendel, 88. 
45 George Berkeley, ~Works of George Berkeley, 3 volumes, The Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1871, edited by Alexander C. Fraser. Principles of Human 
KnowlAdP"A T .. i 
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third division, representations, correspond to Hume's ideas, and nearly 
correspond to Locke's simple ideas of sense and reflection, and his complex 
ideas.46 
After his opening analysis of the objects of knowledge, Berkeley 
continues with a description of what it is that knows. 
There is likewise something which knows or perceives 
them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, remembering 
about them. This perceiving, acting being, is what I call 
Mind, Spirit, Soul, or MYself. By which words I do not 
denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct 
from them, wherein they exist, or which is the same thing, 
whereby they are perceived - for the existence of an idea 
consists in its being perceived.47 
This, however, Fraser warns us, must not be taken to mean that Berkeley 
affirms the Ego, any more than the world of ideas is existing absolutely 
independent of being conscious, but rather that this 'somet~ing,' is the 
Ego, or conscious subject, which the object world infers, and through which 
it is united and becomes intelligible.48 
Hume carries this statement of Berkeley just one step further. He 
asserts that instead of the existence of an idea consisting in being 
perceived, he holds that not only ideas but also impressions are perceived, 
and these L~pressions are all that is perceived.49 
46 ~· 151. 
47 ~, I, 2. 
48 Ibid, 1,156. 
49 Hume, Treatise, I, I, 1. 
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From this point, Berkeley, in following Locke, has little difficulty 
in disposing of material substance. He begins by showing, as Locke before 
him had already shown, that the bmnediate objects of all knowledge are ideas. 
From this he logically concludes that the assumption of a second world of 
external sense-objects is without justification. This is made clear, if we 
understand what is meant by the term, exist, When used in reference to 
sensible things. This point he demonstrates by way of illustration. 
The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and 
feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it 
existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might 
perceive it, or that some other Spirit actually does perceive 
it. There was an odor, that is, it was runelt; there was a 
sound, that is, it was heard, a color, or a figure and it 
was perceived by sight or touch ••• For as to what is said 
of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any 
relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly 
unintelligible. Their Esse is Percipi, nor is it possible 
they should have any existence out of the minds of thinking 
things which perceive them.50 
Later Hume asserts that the essence of the mind are perceptions. That 
there is an actual existing world, Berkeley continues, is 
An opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that 
houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible 
objects, have an existence, real, or natural, distinct 
from their being perceived by the understanding.51 
Here Berkeley holds that the existence of an external world is a matter 
of opinion and further in the s~e section, (Section 4) he calls it 
assurance. 
50 Berkeley, I,3. 
51 Ibid., I,4. 
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Hume also states that all men hold to the belief or opinion of an 
external world.52 
Our of this assertion of the existence of the external world being 
merely a matter of opinion, Berkeley continues by stating that such a view, 
that is the attempted distinction of sensible objects from their being 
perceived, is found at the root to depend upon the doctrine of abstract ideas 
Berkeley summarizes his visw in the following way: 
In a word the things we see and feel - what are they 
but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on 
the sense, and is it possible to separate even in thought, 
any of these from perceptions?53 
If it is possible to separate by fmagination the trunk of a body without 
limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself, 
then there is abstraction. 
In demonstration of the part of the imagination in the consciousness of 
the existence of the external world, Hume uses almost the identical illustra-
tion. 
Suppose I see the legs and thighs of a person in 
motion, While some interposed object conceals the rest 
of the body. Here, it is certain, the imagination spread 
out the whole figure. I give him a head and shoulders, 
and breast and neck. These members I conceive and believe 
him to be possessed of. Nothing can be more evident than 
that this whole operation is performed by the thought or 
imagination alone.54 
52 Hume, Treatise, I,IV,2. 
53 Berkeley, 1,5. 
54 Hume, Appendix to the Treatise. 
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Berkeley concludes this section with the statement that to him, in 
truth the object and sensation are the thing, and therefore he claims that 
they cannot be abstracted from one another. 
InHume's treatment of abstract ideas, Berkeley's most direct and 
significant inflaence is evident. This is evident in that Hume not only 
recognizes his influence, but considers Berkeley's treatment as "one of the 
greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years." 
Hume's own account reveals his indebtedness to Berkeley. 
A great philosopher, (Dr. Berkeley in footnote) has 
disput~d the received opinion in this particular, and has 
asserted, that all general ideas are nothing but particular 
ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more 
extensive signification, and makes them recall upon 
occasion other individuals, which are similar to them •••• 
I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable 
discoveries that has been made of late years in the repub-
lic of letters.55 
Berkeley's treatment of the external world as known by the imagination, 
also indicates his influence upon Hume. If substances exist without the 
mind, asks Berkeley, how could we possibly know them? It would be neither 
by reason, nor by the senses, both of which are insufficient. But someone 
may ask, is it not easy to imagine trees in a park or books in a closet? 
To this he replies, surely that is possible, but is only shows you have the 
power of imagination of the formation of ideas in your mind.56 
56 Berkeley, I,23. 
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T~is is the same position of Hume, in fact he proceeds in his develop-
ment along the same order. Neither the senses, nor the reason is sufficient 
to induce us to believe in the external world, therefore, he concludes we 
hold to an external world by means of the imagination.57 
There remains one negative influence of Berkeley upon Hume, to which 
he sees fit to give considerable emphasis. For in the final analysis Hume 
feels that Berkeley's arguments result in Scepticism, rather than in proof. 
Most of the writings of that ingenius author, (Berkeley) 
form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found 
either among the ancients or modern philosophers ••••• All his 
arguments, though othenvise intended, are in reality, merely 
sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer 
and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause 
that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, 
which is the result of scepticis.m.58 
Thus the influence of Berkeley and his relationship have been clearly 
shown, though not as widespread as was that of John Locke. Berkeley's 
emphasis upon the essence of the mind as perception, and that the existence 
of the external bodies is merely a matter of opinion or assurance, and 
arises neither from the senses, nor reason, but by the imagination, are 
directly evident in Hume's system. Also his doctrine of abstract ideas was 
acknowledged by Hume to be of vital importance. 
However, Locke is connected with Hume's thought in more aspects than 
Berkeley. Like Locke, Hume held that all knowledge comes out of experience 
and observation, and that all knowledge includes sensation and reflection. 
57 Hume, Treatise, I,IV,2. 
58 ~., I,I,7. 
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Likewise Hume held as did Locke that the mind has knowledge only of its own 
ideas, and that the nature of substance was unknown. 
Although Hume accepted the general principles of both Locke and Berkele~ 
he felt impelled for the sake of his science of man to give a definite 
anffWer to the question about the external world. To find this answer he had 
not only to accept the principles of these two forerunners, but at the s~~e 
time to push further the analysis of sense knowledge. 
CHAPTER IV 
AN EVALUATION OF HUME'S POSITION 
In order to evaluate properly the philosophy of David Hume, or any 
other philosopher, it is necessary, first of all, to consider his first 
principle, for, "what is first, last, and always in human knowledge is its 
first principle."l 
The first principle of Hume's philosophy is that "no beings are ever 
present to the mind but perceptions."2 Therefore all that ever appears to 
the mind are these perceptions, for it is "the successive perceptions that 
constitute the mind."3 And if we are to have any certainty it is that of 
these perceptions, since "the only existence of which we are certain are 
perceptions."4 Thus the mind, according to Hume, consists of these percep-
tions~ and 
1 Gilson, 
Whe.t 'V're call a mind is nothing but a heap or 
collection of different perc~ptions, united together 
by certain relations, and supposed though falsely, to 
be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.s 
313. 
2 Hume, Treatise, I,IV,2. 
3 ~·· I,IV,6. 
4 Ibid., I,IV,2. 
-
5 Ibid •. 
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Of these perceptions of the human mind there are two kinds, which Hume 
describes in the opening sentence of the Treatise. 
All the perceptions of the human mind resolve 
themselves into·two distinct kinds, which I call impressions 
and ideas.s 
He gives priority and precedence to the impressions; in fact he asserts 
that this 
Is the first principle I establish in the science 
of human nature; nor ought we to despise it because of 
the simplicity of its appearance ••• the present question 
concerning the precedency of our impressions.7 
Thus having stated that all the existences ere perceptions, of which 
alon.e we are certain, and that these perceptions are the contents of the 
mind, Hume is given over to what Gilson has rightly described as 
The most tempting of all false, first principles 
•••• that thought, not being, is involved in all my 
representations. Here lies the initial option between 
idealism and realism, which will settle once and for 
all the future course of philosophy, and make it a 
success or failure.8 
In this false first principle of thought, Hume has chosen the pathway 
of idealism and subjectivism. However, his principle of ~~anence, that 
"no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions," need not be 
accepted. For on the basis of this principle knowledge is measured by 
knowledge, which leads all along the way to uncertainty and ends ultimately 
and inevitably in scepticism. 
6 ~., I,I,l. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Gilson, 316. 
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Since Hume has chosen thought as his first principle~ we notice the 
inadequacy of his first principle of reality, which is his own mind, only 
perceptions, and as that alone exists, he is faced with the problem of the 
external world, which is merely a supposition or belief. 
Likewise the inadequacy of his first principle of knowledge, by which 
we judge knowledge by knowledge, or as Hume terms it, by the comparison of 
ideas. His knowledge is thus reduced to probability. Had Hume begun with 
the first principle of being, which can know other beings, existent things, 
there would be no problem of the existence of the external world, for being 
invo 1 ves the knowledge of other beings, the knowledge of things. 
The inadequacy of his first principle is further evidenced in his own 
treatment of sense knowledge. Here once more he is driven to scepticism. 
He himself admits we must confine ourselves to appearances only, if we are 
to carry 
Our inquiry beyond appearance of objects to the 
sens.es, I am afraid that most of our conclusions will 
be full of scepticism and uncertainty.9 
Why this conclusion? If perceptions alone exist, and they resolve 
themselves into impressions and ideas, all of which are passions,, emotions 
and sensations, again, there remains no way to mea.sure knowledge but, by 
itself. Senses are known only by senses. Therefore Hume is forced to 
confess that though he had begun with 
lmplicit faith in our senses •••• I feel myself at 
present of a quite contrary sentim.ent0 and am inclined to repose no faith at all in my senses.l 
9 Hume, Treatise, I,II,5. 
10 Ibid., I,IV,2. 
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Hume's difficulty with the senses is due to his inability to deal with 
self or personal identity. Since thought, not being, is his first principle, 
he has ruled out metaphysics, by which alone he could realize self. He 
does admit the inadequacy of sense to determine this question. He even goes 
so far as to admit that at this point, we must have recourse to the most 
profound metaphysics to give a satisfactory an5Wer to it~ 11 However, he 
tmmediately adds, that in common life these ideas of "self, and person are 
never very fixed nor determinate.nl2 
Still it is evident that Hume realized the vital importance of this 
question of self or personal identity, and that it is closely related to 
the issue of the external world,_ for shortly after the statement just quoted, 
he returns again to the question, and this time in relationship to the 
external world. 
To begin with the question concerning external 
existences, it may perhaps be said, that setting aside 
the metaphysical question of the identity of a thinking 
substance, our own body evidently belongs to us.l3 
Here again the whole difficulty is due to his first principle of 
thought, for Hume now finds himself enmeshed within the net of his own 
perceptions. His own description best indicates his predicrument. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into 
what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular 
perception, or other, or heat or cold, light or shade 
•••• I never catch myself at any time without a perception, 
and can never observe anything but the perception.l4 
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So he concludes, when he is asleep and insensible regarding himself, 
he is truly to be considered not to exist. And if all hi~ perceptions 
v;ere removed by death, he would be annihilated, and then what would be 
required to consider himself "a perfect nonentity."15 Here it is evident 
Hume would do away with the immortality of the soul. 
Again we see the insufficiency of his first principle, for since all 
the perceptions are impressions and ideas, Hume asks the question concerning 
the ~ateriality of the soul, what is 
The impression that produces it, and tell 
distinctly after what manner that im~ression operates, 
and from what object it is derived?l 
Therefore Hume dismisses the issue and feels it sufficient reason to 
abandon the discussion of the materiality and immateriality of the soul. 
Thus, having seen the inadequacy of Hume's first principle in relation 
to sense knowledge, our self, or personal identity and the innnortality of 
the soul, we now consider his first principle as it applies to reason. 
Beginning with thought, which consists only in perceptions, in turn resolv-
ing themselves in impressions, the faculty of reason becomes to Hume a 
matter of custom and thus has no grounds of evidence for judgment and 
14 ~., I,IV,6. 
15 Ibid. 
16 ~., I,IV,5. 
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demonstration. In other words that by which we alone judge anything as 
being intelligible, becomes to Hume unintelligible, since reason as every 
other faculty is one of perception. 
Therefore his conclusion concerning reason, that it is inadequate, in 
that it cannot give any degree of evidence concerning any proposition, a.nd 
further, that it ends in total suspense of judgment. Having thus ruled out 
reason, Hume is on another road to scepticism. In attempting to answer 
those who reject all arguments of sceptics without inquiry, or examination 
Hume replies 
If the sceptical reasonings be strong, say they, it 
is proof that reason may have some force and authority; 
if weak, they can never.be sufficient to invalidate all 
the conclusions of our understanding. Thus argument is 
not just •••• for reason first appears in possession of 
the throne, prescr.ibing laws, and imposing maxims, with 
an absolute sway and authority. Her enemy, therefore, 
is obliged to take shelter under her protection, end by 
making use of rational arguments to prove the fallacious-
ness and imbecility of reason and produces in a manner 
patent under her own hand and seal. This patent he.s at 
first an authority proportioned to the immediate author-
ity of reason, from which it is derived. But as it is 
supposed to be contradictory to reason, it gradually 
diminishes the force of that governing power, and its 
own at the same time; till at last both vanish away into 
nothing, by a regular and just diminution.l7 
This lengthy description shows Hume's uncertainty and a kind of 
confusion concerning reason. However, he concludes the analysis by stating 
that it is fortunate that nature breaks the force of such sceptical argu-
ments in time, and thus keeps them from influencing our understanding. 
17 ~·• I,IV,l. 
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He further holds that the understanding acting alone, and according 
to its most general principle, "subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest 
degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or in common 
life.nl8 
This leads to Hume's final significant question in which the end of 
reason is clearly seen. He asks, if reason itself be refused, what are the 
consequences? His own words present the best answer and indicate the 
sceptical results as well as the logical dilemma in which he now finds him-
self. He asks the question, 
Shall we then, establish it for a general maxim, 
that no refined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be 
received. Consider well the consequences of such a 
principle. By this means you cut off entirely all science 
and philosophy.l9 
Furthermore, Hume continues, you contradict yourself, since, 
You proceed upon one singular quality of the 
:imagination, and by a parity of reason you embrace all 
of them; and you expressly contradict yourself; since 
this maxim must be built upon preceding reasoning.20 
Finally, he asks what shall be done. If the issue is between false 
reasoning or no reasoning at all, he is at a loss to know what to do. The 
only solution is that this difficulty is soon forgotten, and leaves but a 
smell impression. 
Thus we have seen the complete inadequacy of Hume's first principle. 
18 Ibid., I,IV,7. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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It reduces all knowledge to probability, and destroys the very foundation of 
reason and sense knowledge. If accepted, it ends in the destruction of both 
science and philosophy, in the logical dilemma of self contradiction and 
ends in scepticimn. From this consideration of the inadequacy of his first 
principle, we turn now to his procedure on the basis of this first principle. 
Hume is faced with the problem of the external world. First, let us 
consider his analysis of the imagination, for he concludes that neither the 
senses nor reason are sufficient to give any 'notion' (Hume's own expression) 
of the existence of the external world. This has already been shovm is due 
to his first principle which invalidates both reason and the senses. There-
fore there remains only the imagination, a.nd hence he concludes, it "must be 
entirely owing to the ima.gina.tion.•21 The imagination becomes the faculty 
by which Hume attempts to solve the problem of the existence of the external 
22 
world. 
He describes the operation of the imagination in the following manner. 
Every impression present with the mind, reappears a.s a.n idea. in one of two 
ways. Either as a. lively idea., which he calls memory, or a.s a faint idea., 
it is called imagination. The memory paints its objects in more distinct 
colors, ~hereas in the imagination the perception is faint a.nd languid, a.nd 
cannot be preserved without great difficulty by the mind steady a.nd uniform 
21 ~·• I, IV, 2. 
22 H.H. Price, Hume's Theo~ ~the External World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1940, 15. "The word 'imagination,' is the keyword of Hume's whole theory 
of knowledge." 
for any considerable time."23 
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Hume further states that though both ideas 
of memory and imagination cannot appear in the mind without previous 
impressions, still the imagination is not restrained in the same orde.r as 
the me.m~ry. Later in another distinction he states that "those faculties 
(referring to memory and imagination) are only distinguished by the differen 
feeling of the ideas they present."24 
If the operation of the imagination be only a reappearance of a former 
impression, faint and languid, and hardly able to be preserved by th~ ~ind 
for any length of time steady and uniform, how can it give rise to assurance 
of the external world? Furthermore, if the distinction between memory and 
imagination is only distinguished by the difference in the feeling tone of 
the ideas, and since they are constantly in a flux, how then .can we be 
assured of the external world? Perhaps we should say there is no answer. 
Eut the problem itself~would not have arisen, if Hume had not taken the 
idealistic position of analysis. 
Next, he considers the two principles of the imagination, one permanent, 
irresistible and universal, such as the customary transition from causes 
to effects, and from effects to causes; then the principles which are weak 
and irregular. The former, he holds, are the foundation of all our thoughts 
and actions, so that if they were removed, human nature would immediately 
perish and .go to ruin, while the latter are neither unavoidable nor necessa:cy 
23 Hume, Treatise, I,·I,3. 
24 ~., I, III,5. 
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Concerning the first of the two principles, Hume describes them as 
permanent, irresistible and universal. If the perception in the imagination 
be faint and languid, and can only with great difficulty be preserved for 
considerable time, on what basis can he describe it as permanent? Further-
more, if the perceptions of the imagination be such as to lose their original 
liveliness as in the. corresponding impression, on what ground does Hume call 
it irresistible? And finally, how can he call this principle universal, when 
he has already ruled out any ultimate or universal principles as presumptuous 
and chimerical?25 
Regarding the latter principle, weak and irregular, he likens to the 
ancient philosophers, where~s, the modern philosophy, "pretends to be 
entirely free •• and to arise from the solid, permanent and consistent princi-
ples in the imagination in·the light of his description? 
In the third part of his explanation of the imagination we find the 
scope described, and here it is that Hume allows to the imagination free 
and almost unbounded scope. 
Nothing is more admirable than the readiness with 
which the imagination suggests its ideas, and presents 
them at the very instant in which they become necessary 
or useful. The fancy runs from one end of the universe 
to the other, in collecting those ideas which alone belong 
to any subject. One would think the whole intellectual 
world of ideas was at once subjected to our view, and 
that we did nothing but pick out such as were most proper 
for our purpose. There may not, however, be any present, 
besides those very ideas that are thus collected by a kind 
of magical faculty of the soul, which though it be always 
perfect in the greatest genius, is, however, inexQlicable 
by the utmost efforts of the human understanding.26 
25 ~., Introduction. 
26 Ibid., I,I,7. 
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Here we have a procedural breakdown. The problem of belief in the external 
world is indeed solved. But in solving it we have recourse to the unintelli-
gible. After all why call it inexplicable. We have placed full emphasis on 
perceptions. Have they led us astray? Reality pursues the idealist. Like 
every other idealism, flume's is a misplaced reason. Here he endeavors by 
saying it cannot be explained. 
However, flume is not without scruples. He admits his vacillation is 
contrary to true philosophy, when referring to the two different senses in 
which he uses the word, imagination. 
The word imagination is used in two different senses; 
and though nothing be more contrary to true philosophy 
than this inaccuracy, yet in the following reasonings, I 
have often been obliged to fall into it. When I oppose 
the imagination to memory, I mean the faculty by which we 
form our fainter·ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I 
mean the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative 
and probable reasonings.27 
Thus we have Hume's own analysis of the imagination, on the basis of 
his first principle of immanence. The ~agination becomes but a faint idea 
of a previous impression, distinguished from memory only in the feeling of 
the ideas, and built upon two principles, one permanent, irresistible and 
universal, the other weak and irregular. The imagination can choose its 
ideas at random with free and alnost boundless scope, still it is inexpli-
cable to the human understanding. Furthermore, he admits that the two senses 
in which he uses the word imagination is inaccurate and contrary to true 
philosophy. In one sense the imagination is opposed to memory, in another 
27 ~·• I, III, 9. 
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it is opposed to demonstrative and probable reasonings. 
Here we are making a two-fold criticism. First, no philosophy need 
accept the immanence principle. We can rather accept the evidence of things 
and validly defend their intelligibility as evidential. And if one does not 
accept this principle, he need not accept Hume's analysis of knowledge~ But 
the second criticism is procedural. Hume destroys Rume's bases. We have 
just sho\vn how the imagination fails to explain the belief only by denying 
it. But the imagination fails to explain the belief in the external world. 
Finally Hume climaxes his whole analysis of the imagination and completely 
contradicts his previous explanation, when he places ~amory, senses and the 
understanding all upon the imagination. 
He has previously held the imagination to be in opposition to both 
memory and ·the Understanding. Now he asserts that "t!le memory, senses and 
understanding are therefore all of them founded upon the L~agination, or the 
. •t f .d n28 v~vac~ yo ~ eas. 
How can he now maintain the i~agination founded upon lively ideas, when 
he has already expressly distinguished the imagination from memory, by this 
very distinction, na~ely that the lively ideas of previous impressions were 
what he called memory, and the faint ideas he termed the imagination. 
In the very next sentence, however, Hume admits not only his inconsist-
ency, but even the fallacy of his own analysis. Referring to his previous 
statement that the memory, senses and imagination are all founded upon the 
2s ~·· r.rv.7. 
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imagination, of the vivacity of the ideas, he a~~its that it is no wonder 
that 
A principle so inconstant and fallacious should 
lead us into error when i~plicitly followed, as it must, 
in all its variations. It is this principle which makes 
reason from cause to effect, and •••• which convinces us of 
the continued existence of external objects when absent 
from the senses.29 
Thus we are lead again to scepticism regarding the L~agination in 
relation to the external world and our belief in it ultimately devours all 
knowledge; sense, memory and the understanding. Here once more Hume's 
procedure comes as a result of his first principle. Since he begins with 
thought, he is forced to develop the faculty of the imagination, by which 
he asserts we believe in the external world, and now he confesses that this 
principle is fallacious and inconstant. 
From this analysis of the imagination we now turn to his procedure in 
the treatment of the external world. What happens to the external world? 
Here once more he must proceed from his first principle. If no beings are 
ever present alone constitute the mind, then perception is the only knowle 
and thus all knowledge is reduced to perception. We may then have no w~ 
to grasp the seemingly extra-mentally existing world. The problem for Hume 
then becomes this - how to explain the assertion of an extra mental world, 
as well as the faculty of this assumption. 
It should be emphasized first of all, that Hume nowhere denies nor even 
attempts to doubt the existence of the external world. His problem of the 
29 Ibid. 
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external world involves the question, how does belief or notion of the 
external world arise? In several passages he emphasizes the existence of 
the external world. After the consideration of the scepticism of reason, 
he concludes that even though the sceptic continues to believe and reason, 
and even though he claims he cannot defend his reason by reason, and by the 
same rules 
He must assent to the principle concerning the 
existence of body, even though he cannot pretend by 
any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity.30 
Later in the same paragraph, he adds, 
We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe 
in the existence of body? but it is vain to ask, Whether 
there be body or not? That is the point we must take for 
granted in all of our reasonings.31 
The existence of the external world must be taken for granted in all of 
our reasonings. Why taken for granted? Had Hume begun with the first 
principle of being, the external world would then not have to be taken for 
grant~d, for he would then accept the evidence of things and their intelligi-
bility. Since it is a very part of the development of being, in that being 
knows other beings, or things. 
He again emphasizes the external world in the development of the argu-
ment. He has been considering the way in which the mind perceives, and 
. 
supposes a perception to exist, even when absent from the mind. Here again 
30 ~., I,IV,2. 
31 Ibid. 
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he admits the question is not concerning the external world, but rather the 
way in which the mind proceeds to reach a conclusion. For 
The difficulty is not concerning the matter of 
fact, whether the mind forms the conclusion concerning 
the existence of its perceptions, but only concerning 
the manner in which such a conclusion is formed, and 
the principles from which it is derived.32 
Here two questions arise. First, how can we hold that p~rceptions 
may be absent from the mind and not be annihilated, and second, how does an 
object become present to the mind without creation of a perception or image? 
To the first question, Hume simply states his definition of the mind, 
which is nothing but a heap or collection of perceptions. In the second 
question he maintains the same reasoning continues. Here, however, he 
admits that external objects are seen, felt and become present to the mind, 
that is they acquire such a connection to a collected heap of perceptions. 
Here another inadequacy in Hume' s development is evident. How can we see 
objects, when the perceptions by which we are supposed to see them, resolvin 
into impressions are all internal and perishing. Once more Hume's first 
principle has bound him within the confines of his own mind. 
From here it is but a step for liume to state that we may remove any 
seeming interruption between our perceptions and the external world, by 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
Feigning a continued being •••• but as we here not 
only feign, but believe this continued existence, the 
question is, from whence arises such a belief?33 
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Belief arises in the following manner. Since belief merely consists 
in the vivacity of ideas, and these in tu~n arise from some present impres-
sions, it is conveyed by a quality of relation, in which memory presents 
a vast number of instances of relations. Therefore, belief involves relatio 
resemblance, memory and custom. However, Hume follows this explanation, 
by stating at once the "here we have a propensity to feign the continued 
existence of all sensible objects."34 
Therefore, to Hume, the solution to the problem of the existence of 
the external world lies in the belief of such a world. Here again, the 
inadequacy of Hume's view is seen, arising from his first principle of 
immanence. 
First, his own description of the operation of belief reveals the 
weakness of his view. For 
Belief consists merely in a certain feeling or 
sentiment; in something that is not dependent upon the 
will, but must arise from some determinate causes and 
principles of which we are not masters.35 
If, therefore, we are not masters, that is, if belief is beyond control, 
how then can we have any assurance of its validity, and how can we present 
evidence of any certainty? 
Second, three times, Hume repeats the use of the word, feign, in 
connection with the existence of the external world. Since the word feign 
34 Ibid. 
35 ~., Appendix. 
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means to invent or pretend; if that be the process of the mind in relation 
to the external world, we are again left without any certainty, and the end 
is once more scepticism. 
Third, Hume's own final conclusion to this whole question of belief 
follows logically from his first principle, for he admits that 
It is impossible for us to distinctly conceive 
objects to be in their nature, anything but exactly 
the same with the perceptions.36 
Then follows his own confession from his whole study of the existence 
of the external world, which shows clearly not only the inadequacy of his 
procedure, but the first principle of his procedure, the principle of 
~anence which inevitably ends as Hume now acknowledges. He raises the 
question, 
What then can we look for from this confusion of 
groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and 
falsehood? And how can we justify to ourselves any 
belief we repose in them.?37 
It is interesting to note that he speaks of groundless opinions, which, 
of course is inevitable, since he has refused to accept any evidence of 
being and things, but only the being of his own perceptions. 
What then, is the way out inHume's solution? His own words give the 
answer, and reveal once and for all the consequences, if the principle of 
immanence be carried to its logical conclusions. 
36 ~., I, IV,2. 
37 Ibid. 
This sceptical doubt, both'with respect to reason 
and the senses, is a malady which can never be cured, but 
must return to us every moment, however, we may chase it 
away •••• It is impossible under any system to defend either 
our understanding or senses; and we expose them further 
when we endeavor to justify them in that manner. As the 
sceptical doubt arises naturally from a profound and intense 
reflection on those subjects, it always increases the 
further we car~ our reflections, whether in opposition 
or conformity.38 
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Thus scepticism concerning both reason and the senses is an incurable 
malady, and the fUrther we reflect the greater the scepticism, if one begins 
with Hume's first principle, which necessarily restricts all knowledge to 
knowledge, by means of perceptions, that is sense knowledge, described by 
Hume himself as including passions, sensation and emotions. In his state-
ment that "it is impossible under any system to defend either our under-
standing or senses," he should have included and added, under any system 
that begins with the first principle of immanence. For had he begun with 
the first principle of being which knows other beings, he would soon have 
seen that the intellect is not then in contradiction to the senses, but 
the intellect is in touch with the sense world, and from that first princi-
ple, others follow, one of which is that of sufficient reason, that to every 
being there must be an adequate reason, for if reality be intelligible, 
there' must be a reason for things. 
What then does Hume consider the remedy? There is no way out, for the 
only remedy is "carelessness and inattention."39 For, whatever the reader's 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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view may be at the moment, an hour later he will still be persuaded that 
there is both an internal as well as external world.40 
Why this persuasion, for which Hume cannot account? And we answer 
without reluctance that it is in the very nature of being, by which the 
intellect knows the reality of the external world. 
From this total scepticism of Hume concerning reason and the senses, 
and concerning the problem of the existence of the external world, including 
both the imagination, and belief in the existence of the world, other 
scepticism also follows. 
~~at of the problem of universals, for universala "are but another n~~e 
for what we call concepts or general ideas," and "these ideas or concepts 
are the very stuff of which our knowledge is made."41 
The problem, for Hume, is that concerning abstract or general ideas, 
"whether they be general or particular in the mind's conception of them."42 
Here he refers to a great philosopher, (Dr. Berkeley mentioned in the foot-
note) who disputed the generally held view and Berkeley has concluded, "that 
all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, 
which gives them a more extensive signifioation."43 Hune believes this "to 
40 Ibid. 
41 Gilson, 3. 
42 Hume, Treatise, I,I,7. 
43 Ibid. 
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be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of 
late years in the republic of letters."44 Therefore he desires to confirm 
with some arguments which he feels will put it beyond all doubt and contro-
versy. 
Hume holds that everything is particular in nature. which he states is 
a principle generally received in philosophy. However, when he comes to the 
application, in showing the procedure of abstraction. the difficulty arises. 
For the application of ideas, beyond their nature proceeds 
From our collecting all their possible degrees of 
quantity and quality, in such an hnperfect manner as m~y 
serve the purpose of life.45 
If we find a resemblance gmong several objects that occur to us, we 
apply the same na~e to all of tham, regardless of the differences in quality 
or quantity we may observe.46 Summarizing this whole process, Hume con-
eludes, 
This then. is the nature of our abstract ideas and 
general terms •••• that some ideas are particular in their 
representation. A particular idea becomes general, by 
being annexed to a general term.47 
But someone may inquire, how does this process take place. To which 
Hume answers, it is the work of the imagination. which suggests with 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
88 
readiness its ideas# "the fancy runs from one end of the universe to the 
other in collecting those ideas which belong to any subject."48 
First, it is evident that though Hume does describe the process of the 
imagination by which the universals are considered, he says nothing of the 
nature of the universals themselves, that is what are universals? This may 
be due to the fact that he already in the Introduction to the Treatise ruled 
out universals and ultimate principles, ~~ich from his first principle of 
thought, must be the case. 
Second, the explanation c0ncerning abstract ideas presents a difficulty 
well described by Smith. 
Hume is faced by the same difficulty which also 
faced Berkeley, end to which neither of them had a 
consistent answer ••• howwe can think of 'all', or 'every,' 
or 'any; or how we can think of a 'sort,' or 'kind,' or 
of a common characteristic, if we have no other means 
of doing so than of taking a particular idea a represent-
ative of others resembling it.49 
Third, and most important, if there be no universals, what becomes of 
knowledge? Hume must answer, since he has chosen the first principle of 
thought, that all knovrledge is reduced to probability, for since the mind 
knows only its only perceptions, and these are within man, knowledge becomes 
merely a matter of probability. 
What happens to causation in Hume's system? He defines a cause as 
48 Ibid. 
An object precedent and contiguous to another, and 
so united with it, that the idea of the one determines 
49 Smith, 260. 
the mind to form an idea of the other, and the impression 
of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.SO 
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Although the probabilities of causes are of various kinds, they are 
all derived from the same origin, namely, "the association of ideas to a 
present impression." Hence the relation of causes to effects is the work 
of the imagination, for "each impression draws along with it a precise idea, 
which takes its place in the imagination, as something solid and real, 
certain and invariable."51 
But we have already seen that from Hume's own analysis, beginning with 
his first principle, the imagination leads to scepticism, how then can it 
present ideas as real, certain and invariable? 
Hume also considers the question of efficacy of power in causation. 
He feels it has been the basis of much dispute among philosophers both 
ancient and modern. However, he acknowledges that he has rec'eived little 
encouragement from these philosophers, "who pretended to explain the secret 
force and energy of causes."52 
He dismisses the whole discussion, however, with the restatement of his 
former principle. 
50 Hume, Treatise, I,III,l4. 
51 Ibid., I, III,3. 
52 Ibid., I,III,l4. This reference is footnoted with a notation, as 
fOTiows: See Father Malebranche, Book VI, Part II, Chapter III. 
We have established it as a principle that as all 
ideas are derived from impressions, or some precedent percep-
tions, it is impossible we can have any idea of power or 
efficacy, unless some instances can be produced, wherein this 
power is perceived to exert itselr.53 
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Finally, he considers it frivolous of those who say that effect must 
have a cause, since it is implied in the very meaning of effect. Still, thi 
does not prove that every being must be preceded by a cause, any more than 
one would reason because eve~J husband has a wife, that therefore it follows 
that every man must be married. The real issue, he feels, is this, whether 
every object that begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause, and 
to this he answers most emphatically," and this I assert to be neither 
intuitively nor demonstratively certain."54 
Here again Hume is caught in the net of his first principle of 
Lmmanence. For had he begun with the first principle of being, that very 
first principle involves existence, and that existence is due either to 
itself or some other cause. 
In Hume's further analysis of substance and the soul, his first 
principle again confines his conclusion. For in the light of his first 
principle, only perceptions are existing in the mind, which resolve into 
impressions and ideas, and thus substance is ruled out. There are only 
two kinds of impressions, those of sensation and those of reflection. The 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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idea of substance could not possibly come from some impression of sensation. 
for by which of the senses could it be perceived? Then it must come from 
reflection, but all the impressions resolve into our passions and emotions. 
none of which could possibly represent a substance. Therefore we have no 
idea of substance, for that idea is nothing but a collection of simple 
ideas united by my imagination~ Thus he concludes that 
These principles of substantial forms, and accidents, 
are not in reality any of the known properties of §gdies, 
but are perfectly unintelligible and inexplicable. 
From Hume's own first principle, substance and accidents must be 
unintelligible and inexplicable, since he has no principle of intelligibi-
lity, since he has already ruled out reason as insufficient, and but 
instinctive and unintelligible. 
Thus, he likewise concludes, on the same basis of his first principle 
that the question concerning the substance of the soul is utterly unintelli-
56 gible. 
Concerning his scepticism of self or personal identity, we have already 
taken note, however, it is indeed interesting to mention here the criticism 
of those who would be inclined to agree with most of Hume's position. 
Smith observes that Hume is inconsistent in his analysis of self, for 
several times in dealing with the passions he speaks of the self as if it 
were actual, and not just a bundle of perceptions. 
55 Ibid. 
56 ~·· r.rv,s. 
It is evident that the idea or rather impression 
or ourselves is always intLmately present with us, and 
that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception 
of our own person.57 
Again Hume states that 
The immediate object of pride and himility is 
self, or that identical person of whose thoughts, 
actions, and sensations, we are intemately conscious.58 
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In this second passage Hume definitely use~ the term self or person, 
though, he by the sheer force of his own first principle, has been forced 
to rule it out. 
Price also pertinently remarks that when Hume speaks of the operation 
of the imagination, as making a smooth transition, that 
It the imagination is to make this smooth transition 
from item to item, must not it, itself gave an identity 
which is not fictitious or constructed? 9 
That Hume realized, e_t least to some degree, his own deficiency in this 
respect is obvious from his confession in the Appendix. He had entertained 
some hope that even though his theory of the intellectual world might be 
deficient, it would at least free him frdm these absurdities and contra-
dictions ~~ich accompany every explanation of reason concerning the material 
;vorld. But now he finds himself in a labyrinth, after dealing with his 
section on personal identity, he knows not how to correct his former 
57 ~., II,I,ll. 
58 ~·• II,II,l. 
59 Price, 6. 
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opinions, nor how to render them consistent.60 
He finally admits his dilemma, which he is unable to render consistent 
or to renounce two principles that unite our successive perceptions in our 
thought or consciousness. 
That all our distinct perceptions are distinct 
existences, and that the mind never perceives any real 
connection among distinct existences.61 
We have seen clearly that Hume's first principle of immanence, that 
no beings are ever present to the mind but its perceptions, has led to his 
inadequate analysis of both reason and senses, the imagination and the 
external world, and that accepting his first principle, we not only end in 
uncertainty, but scepticism. In the last above quoted confession of Hume 
at the very end of his lrl1ole study, he admits that he actually has found no 
solution to the problem of the external world. 
As has been indicated continually, it is not necessary to accept Hume's 
first principle of immanence, that thought is the first principle. Had Hume 
begun with the.first principle of being, he would have had an adequate 
solution to the problem of the existent world, and at the same time the 
removal of scepticism. 
Beginning therefore, with the principle of being, we have the basis 
for knowledge and for metaphysics. First of all, if we begin with being, 
the notion of being, certain first principles follow. 
60 Hume, Treatise, Appendix 
61 Ibid. 
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First, I compare being with it~elf and find that it is identical, and 
thus state as the principle of identity, whatever is, is; or, if a being is, 
it is. This, we find was one of Hume's co'nstant difficulties in considera-
tion of self and personal identity. 
Second, I come to the second principle, that if being is, I compare 
it with that which is not, I derive another principle,_that a thing cannot 
be and not be at the smne time. This is the principle of contradiction. 
It has been evident, that Hume's numerous statements of contradiction are 
due to his first principle of thought. Had he begun with being, this 
second principle would have become evident to him. 
Thus being is the first principle from which all other ,knowledge may 
be derived progressively. And the human intellect in touch with the 
sensible world intuits the first principles. It should be emphasized, 
however, that 
Reason has not to prove any one of these first 
principles, otherv1ise they would not be first prin-
ciples but conclusions; but it is by them that reason 
proves all the rest •••• The first principle brings with 
it, therefore, both the certitude that metaphysics is 
the science of being as being, and the ab~tract laws 
according to which that science has to be constructed.62 
It is because of this lack of understanding on the part of Hume of the 
first principle that he uses the word with confused meaning, as a supposi-
tion or idea. 
Here also is the reason for the inadequacy of any certitude in Hume. 
He refers in numerous passages to metaphysical reasonings, particularly_ 
62 Gilson, 314. 
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when considering the question of personal identity, but on the basis of 
his first principle he has ruled out all metaphysics, which alone can give 
intellectual certainty. 
He also rules out reason on the basis of his starting point, and 
though he accepts sense knowledge, he has no way to validate that knowledge 
but by itself. Hence his sceptical conclusions. 
Thus had Hume begun with the first principle of.being, a position of 
realism, rather than his idealism, subjective and empirical only, he would 
have been able to adequately solve the problem of the external world, and 
the problem which he admits in the very end of his work, remains insoluble, 
as it must, in the nature of the case, would have been completely solved. 
Therefore it is evident that the reason Hume's philosophy leads all 
along the way to doubt and uncertainty and ends in sceptical philosophy is 
due to his first principle. Instead of making thought a part of being, he 
enclosed a 11 being in thought, making mind, to be nothing but a heap or 
collection of perceptions. Thus his subjective idealism, his empirical 
attack throughout his whole system with no ultimate point of reference out-
side of that mind which is always perceivir~ itself. Thus, what Gilson eo 
expresses of any philosopher, is particularly realized in David Hume, in 
that he did "include the whole in one of its parts."63 
For Hume the part was knowledge, in fact, sense knowledge. Of that 
part he gave us a rich and stirhulatin,g analysis. But, unfortunately for 
63 ~·· 316. 
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h~ and for the many subject to his influence. to that part he sacrificed 
the whole. Thus having.locked himself within a part of reality. he was 
never able to get out and never able to regain the whole. 
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